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Compares prior estimates of the size of an occupation force that the U.S. military can sustain in Iraq with the military¿s actual practice up to Oct. 2005. The DoD made policy decisions that increased its ability to sustain a larger occupation force compared with a previous estimate. That includes terminating the U.S. military mission in Bosnia, reducing the U.S. presence in NE Asia, and adopting more demanding goals for how rapidly U.S. forces should rotate through extended deployments. The major difference between the size of an occupation force in Iraq 2003-10/05 and the estimate of the size of a sustainable force derives from DoD¿s practice of deploying active- and reserve-component units at rates in excess of what are considered sustainable. Illus.
Book Synopsis Analysis of the U. S. Military¿s Ability to Sustain an Occupation in Iraq by : Adam Talaber
Download or read book Analysis of the U. S. Military¿s Ability to Sustain an Occupation in Iraq written by Adam Talaber and published by DIANE Publishing. This book was released on 2008-09 with total page 55 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Compares prior estimates of the size of an occupation force that the U.S. military can sustain in Iraq with the military¿s actual practice up to Oct. 2005. The DoD made policy decisions that increased its ability to sustain a larger occupation force compared with a previous estimate. That includes terminating the U.S. military mission in Bosnia, reducing the U.S. presence in NE Asia, and adopting more demanding goals for how rapidly U.S. forces should rotate through extended deployments. The major difference between the size of an occupation force in Iraq 2003-10/05 and the estimate of the size of a sustainable force derives from DoD¿s practice of deploying active- and reserve-component units at rates in excess of what are considered sustainable. Illus.
More than 180,000 U.S. military personnel are currently involved in the occupation of Iraq about 150,000 of them deployed in Iraq itself and the rest supporting the occupation from neighboring countries (primarily Kuwait). According to the Department of Defense (DoD), the occupation is costing about $3.9 billion a month to sustain. At the request of the Ranking Member of the Senate Appropriations Committee, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has examined the United States capability to sustain an occupation force in Iraq over the long term and the associated costs. In performing its analysis, CBO made no assumptions about how long the occupation might last or about the size of the force that might be necessary. Instead, CBO s work focused on determining how large an occupation the U.S. military could sustain in Iraq indefinitely while still maintaining acceptable levels of military readiness and not jeopardizing the quality of the all-volunteer force under various policy options. Those options include using only combat troops from the Army s active component for the occupation, employing other existing U.S. ground forces as well, and expanding current forces to incorporate two additional Army divisions.
Book Synopsis An Analysis of the U.S. Military's Ability to Sustain an Occupation of Iraq by :
Download or read book An Analysis of the U.S. Military's Ability to Sustain an Occupation of Iraq written by and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 48 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: More than 180,000 U.S. military personnel are currently involved in the occupation of Iraq about 150,000 of them deployed in Iraq itself and the rest supporting the occupation from neighboring countries (primarily Kuwait). According to the Department of Defense (DoD), the occupation is costing about $3.9 billion a month to sustain. At the request of the Ranking Member of the Senate Appropriations Committee, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has examined the United States capability to sustain an occupation force in Iraq over the long term and the associated costs. In performing its analysis, CBO made no assumptions about how long the occupation might last or about the size of the force that might be necessary. Instead, CBO s work focused on determining how large an occupation the U.S. military could sustain in Iraq indefinitely while still maintaining acceptable levels of military readiness and not jeopardizing the quality of the all-volunteer force under various policy options. Those options include using only combat troops from the Army s active component for the occupation, employing other existing U.S. ground forces as well, and expanding current forces to incorporate two additional Army divisions.
In response to your request, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has compared its prior estimates of the size of an occupation force that the U.S. military can sustain in Iraq with the military's actual practice over the past few years. The Department of Defense (DoD) has made some policy decisions over the past two and a half years that have increased its ability to sustain a larger occupation force compared with CBO's previous estimate. Those decisions include terminating the U.S. military mission in Bosnia, reducing the U.S. presence in North East Asia, and adopting somewhat more demanding goals for how rapidly U.S. forces should rotate through extended deployments. However, the majority of the difference between the size of an occupation force in Iraq over the past two and a half years and CBO's estimate of the size of a sustainable force derives from DoD's employing practices that depart from the standards that DoD states are preferable and that CBO uses in its analysis. The most significant such practice has been deploying active- and reserve-component units at rates in excess of what are generally considered sustainable. The attachment to this letter provides some background on the size and nature of the military forces deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq, discusses how CBO compared its prior estimate with DoD's actual practice, and answers the remainder of your specific questions.
Book Synopsis An Analysis of the U.S. Military's Ability to Sustain an Occupation of Iraq by :
Download or read book An Analysis of the U.S. Military's Ability to Sustain an Occupation of Iraq written by and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 12 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In response to your request, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has compared its prior estimates of the size of an occupation force that the U.S. military can sustain in Iraq with the military's actual practice over the past few years. The Department of Defense (DoD) has made some policy decisions over the past two and a half years that have increased its ability to sustain a larger occupation force compared with CBO's previous estimate. Those decisions include terminating the U.S. military mission in Bosnia, reducing the U.S. presence in North East Asia, and adopting somewhat more demanding goals for how rapidly U.S. forces should rotate through extended deployments. However, the majority of the difference between the size of an occupation force in Iraq over the past two and a half years and CBO's estimate of the size of a sustainable force derives from DoD's employing practices that depart from the standards that DoD states are preferable and that CBO uses in its analysis. The most significant such practice has been deploying active- and reserve-component units at rates in excess of what are generally considered sustainable. The attachment to this letter provides some background on the size and nature of the military forces deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq, discusses how CBO compared its prior estimate with DoD's actual practice, and answers the remainder of your specific questions.
Book Synopsis Analysis of the U.S. Military's Ability To Sustain an Occupation of Iraq by : Adebayo Adedji
Download or read book Analysis of the U.S. Military's Ability To Sustain an Occupation of Iraq written by Adebayo Adedji and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 43 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
More than 150,000 U.S. military personnel are currently involved in the occupation of Iraq -- about 120,000 of them deployed in Iraq itself and the rest supporting the occupation from neighboring countries (primarily Kuwait). This past September, at the request of the Senate Appropriations Committee, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) examined the United States' capability to sustain an occupation force in Iraq over the long term and the associated costs. This testimony describes the results of that work. In performing its analysis, CBO made no assumptions about how long the occupation might last or about the size of the force that might be necessary. Instead, CBO's work focused on determining how large an occupation the U.S. military could sustain in Iraq indefinitely -- while still maintaining acceptable levels of military readiness and not jeopardizing the quality of the all-volunteer force -- under various policy options. Those options include using only combat troops from the Army's active component for the occupation, employing other existing U.S. ground forces as well, and expanding current forces to incorporate two additional Army divisions. CBO's analysis indicates that the active Army would be unable to sustain an occupation force of the present size beyond about March 2004 if it chose not to keep individual units deployed to Iraq for longer than one year without relief. In the 6 to 12 months after March, the level of U.S. forces in Iraq would begin to decline as units that had been deployed for a year were relieved and were not replaced on a one-for-one basis. After the winter of 2004-2005, the United States could sustain -- indefinitely, if need be -- an occupation force of 38,000 to 64,000 military personnel using only combat units from the Army's active component (and some support units from the reserves), the option that constitutes the base case in this analysis. With a force that size, the occupation would cost $8-$12 billion per year.
Book Synopsis CBO Testimony: The Ability of the U.S. Military to Sustain an Occupation in Iraq by :
Download or read book CBO Testimony: The Ability of the U.S. Military to Sustain an Occupation in Iraq written by and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 46 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: More than 150,000 U.S. military personnel are currently involved in the occupation of Iraq -- about 120,000 of them deployed in Iraq itself and the rest supporting the occupation from neighboring countries (primarily Kuwait). This past September, at the request of the Senate Appropriations Committee, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) examined the United States' capability to sustain an occupation force in Iraq over the long term and the associated costs. This testimony describes the results of that work. In performing its analysis, CBO made no assumptions about how long the occupation might last or about the size of the force that might be necessary. Instead, CBO's work focused on determining how large an occupation the U.S. military could sustain in Iraq indefinitely -- while still maintaining acceptable levels of military readiness and not jeopardizing the quality of the all-volunteer force -- under various policy options. Those options include using only combat troops from the Army's active component for the occupation, employing other existing U.S. ground forces as well, and expanding current forces to incorporate two additional Army divisions. CBO's analysis indicates that the active Army would be unable to sustain an occupation force of the present size beyond about March 2004 if it chose not to keep individual units deployed to Iraq for longer than one year without relief. In the 6 to 12 months after March, the level of U.S. forces in Iraq would begin to decline as units that had been deployed for a year were relieved and were not replaced on a one-for-one basis. After the winter of 2004-2005, the United States could sustain -- indefinitely, if need be -- an occupation force of 38,000 to 64,000 military personnel using only combat units from the Army's active component (and some support units from the reserves), the option that constitutes the base case in this analysis. With a force that size, the occupation would cost $8-$12 billion per year.
Presents the findings of the bipartisan Iraq Study Group, which was formed in 2006 to examine the situation in Iraq and offer suggestions for the American military's future involvement in the region.
Book Synopsis The Iraq Study Group Report by : Iraq Study Group (U.S.)
Download or read book The Iraq Study Group Report written by Iraq Study Group (U.S.) and published by Vintage. This book was released on 2006-12-06 with total page 164 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Presents the findings of the bipartisan Iraq Study Group, which was formed in 2006 to examine the situation in Iraq and offer suggestions for the American military's future involvement in the region.
The Administration is currently planning (and has begun to execute) an increase in U.S. ground forces in Iraq. That plan calls for increasing the number of U.S. combat brigades in-theater by 5 above the December 2006 level of 15, peaking at 20 combat brigades deployed. As of now, the Administration has not specified how long it plans to sustain such an increase. This Congressional Budget Office (CBO) analysis considers the effects of increasing U.S. ground forces in Iraq. In particular, it analyzes the effects on operational tempo and availability of units to respond to other contingencies. To analyze those effects and compare them with the alternatives for employing U.S. forces incorporated in the House and Senate versions of the supplemental appropriation for fiscal year 2007, CBO constructed five deployment scenarios: Scenario 1: U.S. force levels return to and are then maintained indefinitely at 15 combat brigades in-theater (i.e., no increase in forces beyond what has already been executed); Scenario 2: A 4-month increase that builds up to 20 combat brigades in-theater by May 2007 and sustains that increase until August 2007; Scenario 3: A 12-month increase that builds up to 20 combat brigades in-theater by May 2007 and sustains that increase until April 2008; Scenario 4: A 24-month increase that builds up to 20 combat brigades in-theater by May 2007 and sustains that increase until April 2009; and Scenario 5: A withdrawal from Iraq that steadily reduces the number of combat brigades in-theater from current levels until all U.S. combat brigades have departed by June 2008. This analysis updates CBO's previous work on this topic, "An Analysis of the U.S. Military's Ability to Sustain an Occupation in Iraq" (Sep 2003) and "An Analysis of the U.S. Military's Ability to Sustain an Occupation in Iraq: An Update" (Oct 2005), using the same measures of stress on the force (rotation ratios and number of brigades immediately available to respond to other contingencies).
Book Synopsis Some Implications of Increasing U.S. Forces in Iraq by :
Download or read book Some Implications of Increasing U.S. Forces in Iraq written by and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 20 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The Administration is currently planning (and has begun to execute) an increase in U.S. ground forces in Iraq. That plan calls for increasing the number of U.S. combat brigades in-theater by 5 above the December 2006 level of 15, peaking at 20 combat brigades deployed. As of now, the Administration has not specified how long it plans to sustain such an increase. This Congressional Budget Office (CBO) analysis considers the effects of increasing U.S. ground forces in Iraq. In particular, it analyzes the effects on operational tempo and availability of units to respond to other contingencies. To analyze those effects and compare them with the alternatives for employing U.S. forces incorporated in the House and Senate versions of the supplemental appropriation for fiscal year 2007, CBO constructed five deployment scenarios: Scenario 1: U.S. force levels return to and are then maintained indefinitely at 15 combat brigades in-theater (i.e., no increase in forces beyond what has already been executed); Scenario 2: A 4-month increase that builds up to 20 combat brigades in-theater by May 2007 and sustains that increase until August 2007; Scenario 3: A 12-month increase that builds up to 20 combat brigades in-theater by May 2007 and sustains that increase until April 2008; Scenario 4: A 24-month increase that builds up to 20 combat brigades in-theater by May 2007 and sustains that increase until April 2009; and Scenario 5: A withdrawal from Iraq that steadily reduces the number of combat brigades in-theater from current levels until all U.S. combat brigades have departed by June 2008. This analysis updates CBO's previous work on this topic, "An Analysis of the U.S. Military's Ability to Sustain an Occupation in Iraq" (Sep 2003) and "An Analysis of the U.S. Military's Ability to Sustain an Occupation in Iraq: An Update" (Oct 2005), using the same measures of stress on the force (rotation ratios and number of brigades immediately available to respond to other contingencies).
A colloquium on "U.S. Military Operations in Iraq: Planning, Combat, and Occupation" was held November 2, 2005, and was co-sponsored by SSI and Johns Hopkins' School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). Three years beyond the start of that transition, the debate continues about the adequacy of planning for and proficiency of execution of Phase IV operations in Iraq and elsewhere. The debate most often surrounds three issues concerning this final operational phase: the relationship to preceding operational phases; responsibility for planning; and responsibility for execution. Much of the debate to this point has been an unproductive effort to assign blame for shortcomings in the planning for and execution of stability and reconstruction operations; participants in the colloquium moved beyond finding fault, began analyzing the central issues, and addressed solutions.
Book Synopsis U.S. Military Operations in Iraq by : Kate Phillips
Download or read book U.S. Military Operations in Iraq written by Kate Phillips and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 32 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A colloquium on "U.S. Military Operations in Iraq: Planning, Combat, and Occupation" was held November 2, 2005, and was co-sponsored by SSI and Johns Hopkins' School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). Three years beyond the start of that transition, the debate continues about the adequacy of planning for and proficiency of execution of Phase IV operations in Iraq and elsewhere. The debate most often surrounds three issues concerning this final operational phase: the relationship to preceding operational phases; responsibility for planning; and responsibility for execution. Much of the debate to this point has been an unproductive effort to assign blame for shortcomings in the planning for and execution of stability and reconstruction operations; participants in the colloquium moved beyond finding fault, began analyzing the central issues, and addressed solutions.
Book Synopsis The Ability of the U.S. Military to Sustain an Occupation in Iraq by : Douglas Holtz-Eakin
Download or read book The Ability of the U.S. Military to Sustain an Occupation in Iraq written by Douglas Holtz-Eakin and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
In October 2002, the U.S. Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute, in coordination with the Office of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff/G-3, initiated a study to analyze how American and coalition forces can best address the requirements that will necessarily follow operational victory in a war with Iraq. The objectives of the project were to determine and analyze probable missions for military forces in a post-Saddam Iraq; examine associated challenges; and formulate strategic recommendations for transferring responsibilities to coalition partners or civilian organizations, mitigating local animosity, and facilitating overall mission accomplishment in the war against terrorism. The study has much to offer planners and executors of operations to occupy and reconstruct Iraq, but also has many insights that will apply to achieving strategic objectives in any conflict after hostilities are concluded. The current war against terrorism has highlighted the danger posed by failed and struggling states. If this nation and its coalition partners decide to undertake the mission to remove Saddam Hussein, they will also have to be prepared to dedicate considerable time, manpower, and money to the effort to reconstruct Iraq after the fighting is over. Otherwise, the success of military operations will be ephemeral, and the problems they were designed to eliminate could return or be replaced by new and more virulent difficulties.
Book Synopsis Reconstructing Iraq by : Conrad C. Crane
Download or read book Reconstructing Iraq written by Conrad C. Crane and published by Strategic Studies Institute. This book was released on 2003 with total page 92 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In October 2002, the U.S. Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute, in coordination with the Office of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff/G-3, initiated a study to analyze how American and coalition forces can best address the requirements that will necessarily follow operational victory in a war with Iraq. The objectives of the project were to determine and analyze probable missions for military forces in a post-Saddam Iraq; examine associated challenges; and formulate strategic recommendations for transferring responsibilities to coalition partners or civilian organizations, mitigating local animosity, and facilitating overall mission accomplishment in the war against terrorism. The study has much to offer planners and executors of operations to occupy and reconstruct Iraq, but also has many insights that will apply to achieving strategic objectives in any conflict after hostilities are concluded. The current war against terrorism has highlighted the danger posed by failed and struggling states. If this nation and its coalition partners decide to undertake the mission to remove Saddam Hussein, they will also have to be prepared to dedicate considerable time, manpower, and money to the effort to reconstruct Iraq after the fighting is over. Otherwise, the success of military operations will be ephemeral, and the problems they were designed to eliminate could return or be replaced by new and more virulent difficulties.
