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This Brief introduces the wireless spectrum market and discusses the current research for spectrum auctions. It covers the unique properties of spectrum auction, such as interference relationship, reusability, divisibility, composite effect and marginal effect, while also proposing how to build economic incentives into the network architecture and protocols in order to optimize the efficiency of wireless systems. Three scenarios for designing new auctions are demonstrated. First, a truthful double auction scheme for spectrum trading considering both the heterogeneous propagation properties of channels and spatial reuse is proposed. In the second scenario, a framework is designed to enable spectrum group secondary users with a limited budget. Finally, a flexible auction is created enabling operators to purchase the right amounts of spectrum at the right prices according to their users’ dynamic demands. Both concise and comprehensive, Auction Design for the Wireless Spectrum Market is suited for professionals and researchers working with wireless communications and networks. It is also a useful tool for advanced-level students interested in spectrum and networking issues.
Book Synopsis Auction Design for the Wireless Spectrum Market by : Peng Lin
Download or read book Auction Design for the Wireless Spectrum Market written by Peng Lin and published by Springer. This book was released on 2014-05-20 with total page 92 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This Brief introduces the wireless spectrum market and discusses the current research for spectrum auctions. It covers the unique properties of spectrum auction, such as interference relationship, reusability, divisibility, composite effect and marginal effect, while also proposing how to build economic incentives into the network architecture and protocols in order to optimize the efficiency of wireless systems. Three scenarios for designing new auctions are demonstrated. First, a truthful double auction scheme for spectrum trading considering both the heterogeneous propagation properties of channels and spatial reuse is proposed. In the second scenario, a framework is designed to enable spectrum group secondary users with a limited budget. Finally, a flexible auction is created enabling operators to purchase the right amounts of spectrum at the right prices according to their users’ dynamic demands. Both concise and comprehensive, Auction Design for the Wireless Spectrum Market is suited for professionals and researchers working with wireless communications and networks. It is also a useful tool for advanced-level students interested in spectrum and networking issues.
This brief explores current research on dynamic spectrum auctions, focusing on fundamental auction theory, characteristics of the spectrum market, spectrum auction architecture and possible auction mechanisms. The brief explains how dynamic spectrum auctions, which enable new users to gain spectrum access and existing spectrum owners to obtain financial benefits, can greatly improve spectrum efficiency by resolving the artificial spectrum shortage. It examines why operators and users face significant challenges due to specialty of the spectrum market and the related requirements imposed on the auction mechanism design. Concise and up-to-date, Dynamic Spectrum Auction in Wireless Communication is designed for researchers and professionals in computer science or electrical engineering. Students studying networking will also find this brief a valuable resource.
Book Synopsis Dynamic Spectrum Auction in Wireless Communication by : Yanjiao Chen
Download or read book Dynamic Spectrum Auction in Wireless Communication written by Yanjiao Chen and published by Springer. This book was released on 2015-02-06 with total page 64 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This brief explores current research on dynamic spectrum auctions, focusing on fundamental auction theory, characteristics of the spectrum market, spectrum auction architecture and possible auction mechanisms. The brief explains how dynamic spectrum auctions, which enable new users to gain spectrum access and existing spectrum owners to obtain financial benefits, can greatly improve spectrum efficiency by resolving the artificial spectrum shortage. It examines why operators and users face significant challenges due to specialty of the spectrum market and the related requirements imposed on the auction mechanism design. Concise and up-to-date, Dynamic Spectrum Auction in Wireless Communication is designed for researchers and professionals in computer science or electrical engineering. Students studying networking will also find this brief a valuable resource.
Access to the radio spectrum is vital for modern digital communication. It is an essential component for smartphone capabilities, the Cloud, the Internet of Things, autonomous vehicles, and multiple other new technologies. Governments use spectrum auctions to decide which companies should use what parts of the radio spectrum. Successful auctions can fuel rapid innovation in products and services, unlock substantial economic benefits, build comparative advantage across all regions, and create billions of dollars of government revenues. Poor auction strategies can leave bandwidth unsold and delay innovation, sell national assets to firms too cheaply, or create uncompetitive markets with high mobile prices and patchy coverage that stifles economic growth. Corporate bidders regularly complain that auctions raise their costs, while government critics argue that insufficient revenues are raised. The cross-national record shows many examples of both highly successful auctions and miserable failures. Drawing on experience from the UK and other countries, senior regulator Geoffrey Myers explains how to optimise the regulatory design of auctions, from initial planning to final implementation. Spectrum Auctions offers unrivalled expertise for regulators and economists engaged in practical auction design or company executives planning bidding strategies. For applied economists, teachers, and advanced students this book provides unrivalled insights in market design and public management. Providing clear analytical frameworks, case studies of auctions, and stage-by-stage advice, it is essential reading for anyone interested in designing public-interested and successful spectrum auctions.
Book Synopsis Spectrum Auctions by : Geoffrey Myers
Download or read book Spectrum Auctions written by Geoffrey Myers and published by LSE Press. This book was released on 2023-02-15 with total page 314 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Access to the radio spectrum is vital for modern digital communication. It is an essential component for smartphone capabilities, the Cloud, the Internet of Things, autonomous vehicles, and multiple other new technologies. Governments use spectrum auctions to decide which companies should use what parts of the radio spectrum. Successful auctions can fuel rapid innovation in products and services, unlock substantial economic benefits, build comparative advantage across all regions, and create billions of dollars of government revenues. Poor auction strategies can leave bandwidth unsold and delay innovation, sell national assets to firms too cheaply, or create uncompetitive markets with high mobile prices and patchy coverage that stifles economic growth. Corporate bidders regularly complain that auctions raise their costs, while government critics argue that insufficient revenues are raised. The cross-national record shows many examples of both highly successful auctions and miserable failures. Drawing on experience from the UK and other countries, senior regulator Geoffrey Myers explains how to optimise the regulatory design of auctions, from initial planning to final implementation. Spectrum Auctions offers unrivalled expertise for regulators and economists engaged in practical auction design or company executives planning bidding strategies. For applied economists, teachers, and advanced students this book provides unrivalled insights in market design and public management. Providing clear analytical frameworks, case studies of auctions, and stage-by-stage advice, it is essential reading for anyone interested in designing public-interested and successful spectrum auctions.
An international team of experts covers the pros and cons of different auction formats and lessons learned in the field.
Book Synopsis Handbook of Spectrum Auction Design by : Martin Bichler
Download or read book Handbook of Spectrum Auction Design written by Martin Bichler and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2017-10-26 with total page 935 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: An international team of experts covers the pros and cons of different auction formats and lessons learned in the field.
Book Synopsis Spectrum Auctions by : Geoffrey Myers
Download or read book Spectrum Auctions written by Geoffrey Myers and published by . This book was released on 2023 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Spectrum auctions are used by governments to assign and price licenses for wireless communications. Effective auction design recognizes the importance of competition, not only in the auction, but in the downstream market for wireless communications. This paper examines several instruments regulators can use to enhance competition and thereby improve market outcomes.
Book Synopsis Using Spectrum Auctions to Enhance Competition in Wireless Services by : Peter Cramton
Download or read book Using Spectrum Auctions to Enhance Competition in Wireless Services written by Peter Cramton and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Spectrum auctions are used by governments to assign and price licenses for wireless communications. Effective auction design recognizes the importance of competition, not only in the auction, but in the downstream market for wireless communications. This paper examines several instruments regulators can use to enhance competition and thereby improve market outcomes.
Download or read book Where Do We Go from Here? written by and published by Congressional Budget Office. This book was released on 1997 with total page 122 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
The wireless sector is a key contributor to economic activity and growth. Over the next several years, wireless service providers are expected to invest $25 to $53 billion upgrading and expanding their networks to deploy 4G mobile broadband across the nation. All told, wireless broadband investment and the services and innovation supported by such investment are expected to add between $259 and $355 billion to US GDP each year through 2017. The Federal Communications Commission ("Commission" or "FCC") is currently designing several spectrum auctions including the largest ever auction of terrestrial wireless spectrum, currently planned for 2015 (the "Incentive Auction"). The purpose of the Incentive Auction is to free up to 120 MHz of prime spectrum in the 600 MHz band, currently licensed to over-the-air TV broadcasting, to be repurposed for licensing for mobile broadband and other higher value wireless services. To accomplish this goal, the FCC proposes to use a two-part auction process in which broadcast television license holders submit bids for relinquishing their licenses ("Reverse Auction"); and commercial broadband providers bid to acquire licenses to the spectrum freed up ("Forward Auction"). The FCC is currently evaluating various auction design elements to promote competition in the auction. To best ensure this important goal, the FCC is considering a number of auction design features, including spectrum aggregation limits, constraints on the types of bidding allowed, and the appropriate framework to use for the license territories to be used in the Forward Auction. This paper focuses solely on this last issue. We explain here how adopting appropriately small-sized geographic territories is necessary to promote competition and other important economic and social goals, while noting that right-sizing the license territories may not by itself be sufficient to ensure adequate competition and participation in the Forward Auction. For example, the Commission could adopt smaller license sizes and still end with an auction where the two largest wireless carriers aggregate all of the offered spectrum. Such an outcome would be inconsistent with the goal of promoting competition in wireless services. The territory size used for spectrum licenses is as important for valuing spectrum as the parcel size is to real estate value. If all plots were 50 acres, parcels in Manhattan would be too expensive and too large for most; this might compel buyers interested in a small parcel in Manhattan or a parcel in New Jersey adjacent to Manhattan to bid for land they don't want. Alternatively, otherwise qualified buyers might be prevented from buying land altogether. Analogously, wrong-sizing spectrum license territories to be used in future spectrum auctions, and in particular the Incentive Auction, is likely to result in significant and unnecessary inefficiencies in the allocation of scarce radio frequency spectrum resources. For carriers who are compelled to bid for wrong-sized spectrum license packages, the added cost may be sufficient to discourage their participation; or if they do participate, they are less likely to offer successful bids; or if they are successful, they will have fewer resources available to deploy services using the spectrum. In each case, the efficiency of the auction and the larger goals of the process suffer. This paper explains why sufficiently small geographic areas, such as Cellular Market Areas ("CMAs"), are a more appropriates license territory framework to use to ensure that licenses are right-sized in the Forward Auction. Industry participants and the FCC have successfully used smaller geographic license sizes to auction spectrum in the past, and doing so in the Forward Auction offers important advantages. Using smaller territories is better than using the larger Economic Areas ("EAs") or even intermediate-size Partial Economic Areas ("PEAs") because smaller areas efficiently match the needs of bidders to the spectrum they seek. Their use ensures that the planned auction will reallocate spectrum resources efficiently while promoting competition, economic growth, and universal broadband service. Smaller license areas are better than EAs because smaller areas will help to maximize the amount of spectrum that is repurposed for the Forward Auction. Specifically, smaller areas should increase the ability to allow for market variation in areas where limited amounts of spectrum are procured through the Reverse Auction, while reducing the amount of spectrum lost due to international border coordination with Canada and Mexico or other encumbrances. Smaller geographic license sizes should also maximize opportunities for efficient participation by both large and small wireless service providers, and promote efficient build out of spectrum acquired through the Forward Auction. Looking at past auctions, evidence suggests that auction proceeds would be optimized through the use of smaller areas as opposed to EAs. Moreover, using smaller territories is more consistent with the long-term direction of efficient spectrum management reform and future wireless markets, including access to spectrum through secondary market transactions. Finally, this paper rebuts some of the arguments made to date against the use of smaller geographic license areas. Interested parties, particularly the Competitive Carriers Association ("CCA") and their members, have pressed the FCC to license the Forward Auction licenses using smaller territory sizes. These efforts, which included sponsoring an earlier draft of this paper, resulted in a compromise, intermediate solution. The FCC has moved from recommending that the Forward Auction be licensed using Economic Area territories to a compromise territory size based on Partial Economic Areas ("PEAs"). Nonetheless, the debate over the appropriate territory size for FCC licenses continues. As the future of spectrum management is trending toward more granular management of spectrum resources (in space and time), moving toward smaller area regulatory licenses is consistent with this trend; however, the debate continues. We emphasize that while the geographic area of the license is important, there are many other features that must also be considered holistically in order to design an appropriate spectrum auction or management framework, and as such, are likely to vary by band. The focus of the analysis here, while applicable more generally, is on the design of the upcoming Broadcast Incentive Auctions.
Book Synopsis Right-Sizing Spectrum Auction Licenses by : William Lehr
Download or read book Right-Sizing Spectrum Auction Licenses written by William Lehr and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The wireless sector is a key contributor to economic activity and growth. Over the next several years, wireless service providers are expected to invest $25 to $53 billion upgrading and expanding their networks to deploy 4G mobile broadband across the nation. All told, wireless broadband investment and the services and innovation supported by such investment are expected to add between $259 and $355 billion to US GDP each year through 2017. The Federal Communications Commission ("Commission" or "FCC") is currently designing several spectrum auctions including the largest ever auction of terrestrial wireless spectrum, currently planned for 2015 (the "Incentive Auction"). The purpose of the Incentive Auction is to free up to 120 MHz of prime spectrum in the 600 MHz band, currently licensed to over-the-air TV broadcasting, to be repurposed for licensing for mobile broadband and other higher value wireless services. To accomplish this goal, the FCC proposes to use a two-part auction process in which broadcast television license holders submit bids for relinquishing their licenses ("Reverse Auction"); and commercial broadband providers bid to acquire licenses to the spectrum freed up ("Forward Auction"). The FCC is currently evaluating various auction design elements to promote competition in the auction. To best ensure this important goal, the FCC is considering a number of auction design features, including spectrum aggregation limits, constraints on the types of bidding allowed, and the appropriate framework to use for the license territories to be used in the Forward Auction. This paper focuses solely on this last issue. We explain here how adopting appropriately small-sized geographic territories is necessary to promote competition and other important economic and social goals, while noting that right-sizing the license territories may not by itself be sufficient to ensure adequate competition and participation in the Forward Auction. For example, the Commission could adopt smaller license sizes and still end with an auction where the two largest wireless carriers aggregate all of the offered spectrum. Such an outcome would be inconsistent with the goal of promoting competition in wireless services. The territory size used for spectrum licenses is as important for valuing spectrum as the parcel size is to real estate value. If all plots were 50 acres, parcels in Manhattan would be too expensive and too large for most; this might compel buyers interested in a small parcel in Manhattan or a parcel in New Jersey adjacent to Manhattan to bid for land they don't want. Alternatively, otherwise qualified buyers might be prevented from buying land altogether. Analogously, wrong-sizing spectrum license territories to be used in future spectrum auctions, and in particular the Incentive Auction, is likely to result in significant and unnecessary inefficiencies in the allocation of scarce radio frequency spectrum resources. For carriers who are compelled to bid for wrong-sized spectrum license packages, the added cost may be sufficient to discourage their participation; or if they do participate, they are less likely to offer successful bids; or if they are successful, they will have fewer resources available to deploy services using the spectrum. In each case, the efficiency of the auction and the larger goals of the process suffer. This paper explains why sufficiently small geographic areas, such as Cellular Market Areas ("CMAs"), are a more appropriates license territory framework to use to ensure that licenses are right-sized in the Forward Auction. Industry participants and the FCC have successfully used smaller geographic license sizes to auction spectrum in the past, and doing so in the Forward Auction offers important advantages. Using smaller territories is better than using the larger Economic Areas ("EAs") or even intermediate-size Partial Economic Areas ("PEAs") because smaller areas efficiently match the needs of bidders to the spectrum they seek. Their use ensures that the planned auction will reallocate spectrum resources efficiently while promoting competition, economic growth, and universal broadband service. Smaller license areas are better than EAs because smaller areas will help to maximize the amount of spectrum that is repurposed for the Forward Auction. Specifically, smaller areas should increase the ability to allow for market variation in areas where limited amounts of spectrum are procured through the Reverse Auction, while reducing the amount of spectrum lost due to international border coordination with Canada and Mexico or other encumbrances. Smaller geographic license sizes should also maximize opportunities for efficient participation by both large and small wireless service providers, and promote efficient build out of spectrum acquired through the Forward Auction. Looking at past auctions, evidence suggests that auction proceeds would be optimized through the use of smaller areas as opposed to EAs. Moreover, using smaller territories is more consistent with the long-term direction of efficient spectrum management reform and future wireless markets, including access to spectrum through secondary market transactions. Finally, this paper rebuts some of the arguments made to date against the use of smaller geographic license areas. Interested parties, particularly the Competitive Carriers Association ("CCA") and their members, have pressed the FCC to license the Forward Auction licenses using smaller territory sizes. These efforts, which included sponsoring an earlier draft of this paper, resulted in a compromise, intermediate solution. The FCC has moved from recommending that the Forward Auction be licensed using Economic Area territories to a compromise territory size based on Partial Economic Areas ("PEAs"). Nonetheless, the debate over the appropriate territory size for FCC licenses continues. As the future of spectrum management is trending toward more granular management of spectrum resources (in space and time), moving toward smaller area regulatory licenses is consistent with this trend; however, the debate continues. We emphasize that while the geographic area of the license is important, there are many other features that must also be considered holistically in order to design an appropriate spectrum auction or management framework, and as such, are likely to vary by band. The focus of the analysis here, while applicable more generally, is on the design of the upcoming Broadcast Incentive Auctions.
Auctions of licenses to use the radio spectrum conducted by the FCC from 1994-98 will yield $27 billion in receipts to the U.S. treasury. The initial success has generated interest in the use of auctions to raise additional receipts and enhance the value of the spectrum to society. This study examines the results of the initial FCC auctions, the general outlook for future auctions, and the applicability of auctions to the intro. of digital broadcast TV. It also considers the prospects for using auctions and other market mechanisms not only in assigning licenses to specific users, but also in allocating frequencies to different uses. Charts and tables.
Book Synopsis Where Do We Go from Here? by : Coleman Bazelon
Download or read book Where Do We Go from Here? written by Coleman Bazelon and published by DIANE Publishing. This book was released on 1997-07 with total page 101 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Auctions of licenses to use the radio spectrum conducted by the FCC from 1994-98 will yield $27 billion in receipts to the U.S. treasury. The initial success has generated interest in the use of auctions to raise additional receipts and enhance the value of the spectrum to society. This study examines the results of the initial FCC auctions, the general outlook for future auctions, and the applicability of auctions to the intro. of digital broadcast TV. It also considers the prospects for using auctions and other market mechanisms not only in assigning licenses to specific users, but also in allocating frequencies to different uses. Charts and tables.
Book Synopsis Full Committee Hearing on the Impact of the 700 Megahertz Wireless Spectrum Auction on Small Business by : United States. Congress. House. Committee on Small Business
Download or read book Full Committee Hearing on the Impact of the 700 Megahertz Wireless Spectrum Auction on Small Business written by United States. Congress. House. Committee on Small Business and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 110 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
