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Distributive Politics in Developing Countries

Author: Mark Baskin

Publisher: Lexington Books

Published: 2014-10-23

Total Pages: 279

ISBN-13: 073918069X

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This book explores the increasing use of Constituency Development Funds (CDFs) in emerging democratic governments in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, and Oceania. CDFs dedicate public money to benefit parliamentary constituencies through allocations and/or spending decisions influenced by Members of Parliament (MPs). The contributors employ the term CDF as a generic term although such funds have a different names, such as electoral development funds (Papua New Guinea), constituency development catalyst funds (Tanzania), or Member of Parliament Local Area Development Fund (India), etc. In some ways, the funds resemble the ad hoc pork barrel policy-making employed in the U.S. Congress for the past 200 years. However, unlike earmarks, CDFs generally become institutionalized in the government’s annual budget and are distributed according to different criteria in each country. They enable MPs to influence programs in their constituencies that finance education, and build bridges, roads, community centers, clinics and schools. In this sense, a CDF is a politicized form of spending that can help fill in the important gaps in government services in constituencies that have not been addressed in the government’s larger, comprehensive policy programs. This first comprehensive treatment of CDFs in the academic and development literatures emerges from a project at the State University of New York Center for International Development. This project has explored CDFs in 19 countries and has developed indicators on their emergence, operations, and oversight. The contributors provide detailed case studies of the emergence and operations of CDFs in Kenya, Uganda, Jamaica, and India, as well as an analysis of earmarks in the U.S. Congress, and a broader analysis of the emergence of the funds in Africa. They cover the emergence, institutionalization, and accountability of these funds; analyze key issues in their operations; and offer provisional conclusions of what the emergence and operations of these funds say about the democratization of politics in developing countries and current approaches to international support for democratic governance in developing countries.

Book Synopsis Distributive Politics in Developing Countries by : Mark Baskin

Download or read book Distributive Politics in Developing Countries written by Mark Baskin and published by Lexington Books. This book was released on 2014-10-23 with total page 279 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book explores the increasing use of Constituency Development Funds (CDFs) in emerging democratic governments in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, and Oceania. CDFs dedicate public money to benefit parliamentary constituencies through allocations and/or spending decisions influenced by Members of Parliament (MPs). The contributors employ the term CDF as a generic term although such funds have a different names, such as electoral development funds (Papua New Guinea), constituency development catalyst funds (Tanzania), or Member of Parliament Local Area Development Fund (India), etc. In some ways, the funds resemble the ad hoc pork barrel policy-making employed in the U.S. Congress for the past 200 years. However, unlike earmarks, CDFs generally become institutionalized in the government’s annual budget and are distributed according to different criteria in each country. They enable MPs to influence programs in their constituencies that finance education, and build bridges, roads, community centers, clinics and schools. In this sense, a CDF is a politicized form of spending that can help fill in the important gaps in government services in constituencies that have not been addressed in the government’s larger, comprehensive policy programs. This first comprehensive treatment of CDFs in the academic and development literatures emerges from a project at the State University of New York Center for International Development. This project has explored CDFs in 19 countries and has developed indicators on their emergence, operations, and oversight. The contributors provide detailed case studies of the emergence and operations of CDFs in Kenya, Uganda, Jamaica, and India, as well as an analysis of earmarks in the U.S. Congress, and a broader analysis of the emergence of the funds in Africa. They cover the emergence, institutionalization, and accountability of these funds; analyze key issues in their operations; and offer provisional conclusions of what the emergence and operations of these funds say about the democratization of politics in developing countries and current approaches to international support for democratic governance in developing countries.

Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak's Egypt

Author: Lisa Blaydes

Publisher:

Published: 2011

Total Pages: 278

ISBN-13: 9780511991752

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"This book examines the meaning of elections in authoritarian Egypt"--

Book Synopsis Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak's Egypt by : Lisa Blaydes

Download or read book Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak's Egypt written by Lisa Blaydes and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 278 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: "This book examines the meaning of elections in authoritarian Egypt"--

The Sources of Non-discretionary Distributive Politics in Africa

Author: Joseph Asunka

Publisher:

Published: 2014

Total Pages: 91

ISBN-13:

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Since the early 2000s, more and more governments in the developing world have introduced programs to transfer cash and deliver complementary public services directly to citizens using purely economic and other technical criteria. A number of careful studies on some of these programs show that political criteria play no role in predicting who does and does not receive benefits. Some scholars suggest that the rising popularity of non-discretionary distribution of public resources by politicians in some developing countries is indicative of a potential decline of clientelism in those countries. That political support for non-discretionary forms of resource distribution is growing and clientelism may be declining in the developing world is welcome news. But these emerging patterns of public resource distribution by politicians raise important questions. In this dissertation, I develop a theory to explain why politicians would design policies and allocate valued benefits to voters in ways that reduce or eliminate their own discretion. I argue that non-discretionary distributive strategies enable incumbent politicians to build electoral support and thus enhancing their chances of reelection in two ways: first, these strategies enable incumbents to extend benefits to voters outside their circle of loyal voters, potentially broadening their electoral support among those voters. Second, non-discretionary distributive strategies help to reduce the risk of offending and potentially alienating some of their loyal voters. This concern is particularly salient in Africa where access to state resources influences electoral behavior. I test this theory with audit and survey data collected in Ghana. I show that the patterns of resource allocation strategies by politicians and the electoral behavior of voters are best explained by the argument presented in this project. Chapter 2 lays out the main argument and identifies a number of empirical implications. I contrast these implications with those of existing theories of clientelism and those on the effects of economic development on bureaucratic reforms. Chapter 2 concludes with preliminary evidence on the impact of public benefits on voting behavior in Ghana using the 2012 Afrobarometer survey. The results show that voters who benefit from a government healthcare program are more likely to vote for the party in government. This effect is driven largely by voters not affiliated to any party. Chapter 3 tests one of the main implications of my argument: that when incumbents are concerned about their chances of reelection they would be more likely to favor non-discretionary forms of resource distribution in swing areas. I use data from a nationwide assessment of all local governments in Ghana on their compliance with budget allocation rules to test this prediction. The results show that local governments in districts with a swing history score significantly higher on their compliance with budget implementation rules than those without a swing history. Moreover, the magnitude of swing reinforces this effect: compliance with budget implementation rules is significantly higher in those districts where the size of the swing is larger. Chapter 4 analyzes survey data to show how the electoral behavior of voters varies with politicians' resource distribution strategies. I show that voters, particularly swing voters, are significantly more likely to vote for incumbent politicians if they believe that the allocation of public resources by these politicians is fair, that is, non-discretionary. The results also show that among loyal voters of incumbent politicians, support for those politicians who are perceived to favor non-discretionary distributive strategies is slightly higher than those perceived to pursue largely discretionary distributive strategies. Chapter 5 concludes with a discussion of the theoretical and policy implications of the findings.

Book Synopsis The Sources of Non-discretionary Distributive Politics in Africa by : Joseph Asunka

Download or read book The Sources of Non-discretionary Distributive Politics in Africa written by Joseph Asunka and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 91 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Since the early 2000s, more and more governments in the developing world have introduced programs to transfer cash and deliver complementary public services directly to citizens using purely economic and other technical criteria. A number of careful studies on some of these programs show that political criteria play no role in predicting who does and does not receive benefits. Some scholars suggest that the rising popularity of non-discretionary distribution of public resources by politicians in some developing countries is indicative of a potential decline of clientelism in those countries. That political support for non-discretionary forms of resource distribution is growing and clientelism may be declining in the developing world is welcome news. But these emerging patterns of public resource distribution by politicians raise important questions. In this dissertation, I develop a theory to explain why politicians would design policies and allocate valued benefits to voters in ways that reduce or eliminate their own discretion. I argue that non-discretionary distributive strategies enable incumbent politicians to build electoral support and thus enhancing their chances of reelection in two ways: first, these strategies enable incumbents to extend benefits to voters outside their circle of loyal voters, potentially broadening their electoral support among those voters. Second, non-discretionary distributive strategies help to reduce the risk of offending and potentially alienating some of their loyal voters. This concern is particularly salient in Africa where access to state resources influences electoral behavior. I test this theory with audit and survey data collected in Ghana. I show that the patterns of resource allocation strategies by politicians and the electoral behavior of voters are best explained by the argument presented in this project. Chapter 2 lays out the main argument and identifies a number of empirical implications. I contrast these implications with those of existing theories of clientelism and those on the effects of economic development on bureaucratic reforms. Chapter 2 concludes with preliminary evidence on the impact of public benefits on voting behavior in Ghana using the 2012 Afrobarometer survey. The results show that voters who benefit from a government healthcare program are more likely to vote for the party in government. This effect is driven largely by voters not affiliated to any party. Chapter 3 tests one of the main implications of my argument: that when incumbents are concerned about their chances of reelection they would be more likely to favor non-discretionary forms of resource distribution in swing areas. I use data from a nationwide assessment of all local governments in Ghana on their compliance with budget allocation rules to test this prediction. The results show that local governments in districts with a swing history score significantly higher on their compliance with budget implementation rules than those without a swing history. Moreover, the magnitude of swing reinforces this effect: compliance with budget implementation rules is significantly higher in those districts where the size of the swing is larger. Chapter 4 analyzes survey data to show how the electoral behavior of voters varies with politicians' resource distribution strategies. I show that voters, particularly swing voters, are significantly more likely to vote for incumbent politicians if they believe that the allocation of public resources by these politicians is fair, that is, non-discretionary. The results also show that among loyal voters of incumbent politicians, support for those politicians who are perceived to favor non-discretionary distributive strategies is slightly higher than those perceived to pursue largely discretionary distributive strategies. Chapter 5 concludes with a discussion of the theoretical and policy implications of the findings.

Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism

Author: Susan C. Stokes

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Published: 2013-09-23

Total Pages: 343

ISBN-13: 1107042208

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Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism studies distributive politics: how parties and governments use material resources to win elections. The authors develop a theory that explains why loyal supporters, rather than swing voters, tend to benefit from pork-barrel politics; why poverty encourages clientelism and vote buying; and why redistribution and voter participation do not justify non-programmatic distribution.

Book Synopsis Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism by : Susan C. Stokes

Download or read book Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism written by Susan C. Stokes and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2013-09-23 with total page 343 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism studies distributive politics: how parties and governments use material resources to win elections. The authors develop a theory that explains why loyal supporters, rather than swing voters, tend to benefit from pork-barrel politics; why poverty encourages clientelism and vote buying; and why redistribution and voter participation do not justify non-programmatic distribution.

Three Essays on Distributive Politics in India

Author: Shikhar Singh

Publisher:

Published: 2022

Total Pages: 0

ISBN-13:

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This dissertation presents three essays on distributive politics in India:Governments distribute a variety of benefits to win votes. Why do some benefits have greater electoral impact than others? This paper provides descriptive evidence that a USD10 cooking gas cylinder and USD2000 house have comparable electoral impact in India. This motivates a typology in which distributive decisions can be organized on two dimensions: the cost of a benefit, and how it is distributed. Politicians face two key trade-offs: first, given a finite budget, they can widely distribute a cheap benefit or give an expensive benefit to fewer voters; and second, they can either distribute the benefit through brokers or as a rule based, non-contingent, direct transfer. Clientelism skews distribution in favor of party loyalists but provides effective credit claiming. Programmatic distribution provides better targeting but worse credit claiming. Using data from India's National Election Studies, I show that there is political targeting of the cooking gas cylinder but not the house. Cooking gas cylinder recipients are also more likely to be contacted by the ruling party broker before elections but not house recipients. The evidence suggests that party elites pursue a mixed strategy of distribution: relying on brokers to deliver cheap benefits and government programs to deliver expensive benefits. Brokers make up for the value difference in benefits through effective canvassing.Can an expensive material benefit, delivered programmatically to voters outside the ruling party's ethnic core, win support for the benefit-giving party, and undercut the distributive salience of ethnicity? The literature says that material benefits can compensate for ethnic or ideological disutility, and that socioeconomic targeting can weaken beliefs about co-ethnic politicians being more likely to deliver benefits to the voter. I find that a large-scale, rural housing program in India generates support for the benefit-giving party among ethnically opposed voters and even those that do not receive the benefit. Beneficiaries feel gratitude, while non-beneficiaries report that many people like them have benefited from the program. There is no impact on the distributive salience of ethnicity. Beneficiaries recognize that the ruling party has done something for them, and are aware of the programmatic features of distribution. Yet, ethnic considerations predominantly shape distributive beliefs about politicians in a behavioral game. This finding has implications for ethnically diverse, developing democracies where programmatic competition is seen as an antidote to ethnic politics. Even an expensive benefit like a house, delivered programmatically, does little to reduce the distributive salience of ethnicity.Governments in developing countries spend considerable money distributing material benefits to their citizens. Some of these benefits are distributed through brokers, others as rule based, non-contingent, direct transfers. Governments are less likely to adopt programmatic distribution if voters do not prioritize efficient implementation, namely less leakage and more accurate targeting. Since rule based, non-contingent, direct transfers can end up benefiting out-partisans and ethnic out-groups, supporters of the ruling party should not punish their party for benefiting non-supporters. To assess whether voter behavior incentivizes programmatic distribution, I conduct two pre-registered studies in India, an online survey experiment and a telephone-based survey experiment fielded in 12 different languages. Indian voters reward good distributive performance but are more focused on outcomes than efficient implementation. They place a modest premium on distributive efficiency. Strikingly, ruling party supporters do not punish their party for benefiting ethnic out-groups. These findings suggest there are strong incentives for politicians to deliver benefits, though not entirely as rule-based, non-contingent direct transfers.

Book Synopsis Three Essays on Distributive Politics in India by : Shikhar Singh

Download or read book Three Essays on Distributive Politics in India written by Shikhar Singh and published by . This book was released on 2022 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation presents three essays on distributive politics in India:Governments distribute a variety of benefits to win votes. Why do some benefits have greater electoral impact than others? This paper provides descriptive evidence that a USD10 cooking gas cylinder and USD2000 house have comparable electoral impact in India. This motivates a typology in which distributive decisions can be organized on two dimensions: the cost of a benefit, and how it is distributed. Politicians face two key trade-offs: first, given a finite budget, they can widely distribute a cheap benefit or give an expensive benefit to fewer voters; and second, they can either distribute the benefit through brokers or as a rule based, non-contingent, direct transfer. Clientelism skews distribution in favor of party loyalists but provides effective credit claiming. Programmatic distribution provides better targeting but worse credit claiming. Using data from India's National Election Studies, I show that there is political targeting of the cooking gas cylinder but not the house. Cooking gas cylinder recipients are also more likely to be contacted by the ruling party broker before elections but not house recipients. The evidence suggests that party elites pursue a mixed strategy of distribution: relying on brokers to deliver cheap benefits and government programs to deliver expensive benefits. Brokers make up for the value difference in benefits through effective canvassing.Can an expensive material benefit, delivered programmatically to voters outside the ruling party's ethnic core, win support for the benefit-giving party, and undercut the distributive salience of ethnicity? The literature says that material benefits can compensate for ethnic or ideological disutility, and that socioeconomic targeting can weaken beliefs about co-ethnic politicians being more likely to deliver benefits to the voter. I find that a large-scale, rural housing program in India generates support for the benefit-giving party among ethnically opposed voters and even those that do not receive the benefit. Beneficiaries feel gratitude, while non-beneficiaries report that many people like them have benefited from the program. There is no impact on the distributive salience of ethnicity. Beneficiaries recognize that the ruling party has done something for them, and are aware of the programmatic features of distribution. Yet, ethnic considerations predominantly shape distributive beliefs about politicians in a behavioral game. This finding has implications for ethnically diverse, developing democracies where programmatic competition is seen as an antidote to ethnic politics. Even an expensive benefit like a house, delivered programmatically, does little to reduce the distributive salience of ethnicity.Governments in developing countries spend considerable money distributing material benefits to their citizens. Some of these benefits are distributed through brokers, others as rule based, non-contingent, direct transfers. Governments are less likely to adopt programmatic distribution if voters do not prioritize efficient implementation, namely less leakage and more accurate targeting. Since rule based, non-contingent, direct transfers can end up benefiting out-partisans and ethnic out-groups, supporters of the ruling party should not punish their party for benefiting non-supporters. To assess whether voter behavior incentivizes programmatic distribution, I conduct two pre-registered studies in India, an online survey experiment and a telephone-based survey experiment fielded in 12 different languages. Indian voters reward good distributive performance but are more focused on outcomes than efficient implementation. They place a modest premium on distributive efficiency. Strikingly, ruling party supporters do not punish their party for benefiting ethnic out-groups. These findings suggest there are strong incentives for politicians to deliver benefits, though not entirely as rule-based, non-contingent direct transfers.

Divide and Deal

Author: Ian Shapiro

Publisher: NYU Press

Published: 2010-07-12

Total Pages: 366

ISBN-13: 0814740596

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Why are democracies so unequal? Despite the widespread expectation that democracy, via expansion of the franchise, would lead to redistribution in favor of the masses, in reality majorities regularly lose out in democracies. Taking a broad view of inequality as encompassing the distribution of wealth, risk, status, and well-being, this volume explores how institutions, individuals, and coalitions contribute to the often surprising twists and turns of distributive politics. The contributors hail from a range of disciplines and employ an array of methodologies to illuminate the central questions of democratic distributive politics: What explains the variety of welfare state systems, and what are their prospects for survival and change? How do religious beliefs influence people’s demand for redistribution? When does redistributive politics reflect public opinion? How can different and seemingly opposed groups successfully coalesce to push through policy changes that produce new winners and losers? The authors identify a variety of psychological and institutional factors that influence distributive outcomes. Taken together, the chapters highlight a common theme: politics matters. In seeking to understand the often puzzling contours of distribution and redistribution, we cannot ignore the processes of competition, bargaining, building, and destroying the political alliances that serve as bridges between individual preferences, institutions, and policy outcomes.

Book Synopsis Divide and Deal by : Ian Shapiro

Download or read book Divide and Deal written by Ian Shapiro and published by NYU Press. This book was released on 2010-07-12 with total page 366 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Why are democracies so unequal? Despite the widespread expectation that democracy, via expansion of the franchise, would lead to redistribution in favor of the masses, in reality majorities regularly lose out in democracies. Taking a broad view of inequality as encompassing the distribution of wealth, risk, status, and well-being, this volume explores how institutions, individuals, and coalitions contribute to the often surprising twists and turns of distributive politics. The contributors hail from a range of disciplines and employ an array of methodologies to illuminate the central questions of democratic distributive politics: What explains the variety of welfare state systems, and what are their prospects for survival and change? How do religious beliefs influence people’s demand for redistribution? When does redistributive politics reflect public opinion? How can different and seemingly opposed groups successfully coalesce to push through policy changes that produce new winners and losers? The authors identify a variety of psychological and institutional factors that influence distributive outcomes. Taken together, the chapters highlight a common theme: politics matters. In seeking to understand the often puzzling contours of distribution and redistribution, we cannot ignore the processes of competition, bargaining, building, and destroying the political alliances that serve as bridges between individual preferences, institutions, and policy outcomes.

The Politics of Economic Adjustment

Author: Stephan Haggard

Publisher: Princeton University Press

Published: 2018-06-05

Total Pages: 371

ISBN-13: 0691188033

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In the 1980s some developing countries adopted orthodox market-oriented policies in response to international economic crises, others experimented with alternative programs, and still others failed to develop coherent adjustment strategies of any sort. Building on the case studies in Economic Crisis and Policy Choice, these essays offer comparative analysis of these divergent experiences with macroeconomic stabilization and structural adjustment. Barbara Stallings and Miles Kahler explore the external pressures on governments. Peter Evans and John Waterbury examine the role of the state in the adjustment process, Evans through the lens of earlier historical experience with economic restructuring, Waterbury by focusing on the politics of privatization. Joan Nelson analyzes the politics of income distribution in the adjustment process, and Haggard and Kaufman investigate the political correlates of inflation and stabilization. A final essay assesses the prospects for combining market-oriented reforms with political democratization.

Book Synopsis The Politics of Economic Adjustment by : Stephan Haggard

Download or read book The Politics of Economic Adjustment written by Stephan Haggard and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2018-06-05 with total page 371 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In the 1980s some developing countries adopted orthodox market-oriented policies in response to international economic crises, others experimented with alternative programs, and still others failed to develop coherent adjustment strategies of any sort. Building on the case studies in Economic Crisis and Policy Choice, these essays offer comparative analysis of these divergent experiences with macroeconomic stabilization and structural adjustment. Barbara Stallings and Miles Kahler explore the external pressures on governments. Peter Evans and John Waterbury examine the role of the state in the adjustment process, Evans through the lens of earlier historical experience with economic restructuring, Waterbury by focusing on the politics of privatization. Joan Nelson analyzes the politics of income distribution in the adjustment process, and Haggard and Kaufman investigate the political correlates of inflation and stabilization. A final essay assesses the prospects for combining market-oriented reforms with political democratization.

Distributive Politics in Malaysia

Author: Hidekuni Washida

Publisher: Routledge

Published: 2018-10-11

Total Pages: 259

ISBN-13: 1351797980

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The election on 9 May 2018 ended six decades of rule by the ruling coalition in Malaysia (Barisan Nasional or BN, formerly the Alliance). Despite this result, the BN’s longevity and resilience to competition is remarkable. This book explores the mechanisms behind the emergence, endurance, fight for survival and decline of the party’s dominance. Using a systematic analysis of key resources (budgets, posts, and seats), Washida challenges the conventional argument that a punitive threat to exclude opposition supporters from distributive benefits sustained the loyalty of the masses as well as the elites. He also calls into question whether the mere existence of party organization in and of itself enables leaders to credibly commit to power-sharing. Instead he posits a theory of mobilization agency, in which a party leader needs to design an effective incentive mechanism. In addition, he explains how the BN had manufactured legislative dominance by tactical gerrymandering and malapportionment. The insights drawn from the Malaysian case can help deepen our understanding of the rise and fall of authoritarian parties and distributive politics in general.

Book Synopsis Distributive Politics in Malaysia by : Hidekuni Washida

Download or read book Distributive Politics in Malaysia written by Hidekuni Washida and published by Routledge. This book was released on 2018-10-11 with total page 259 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The election on 9 May 2018 ended six decades of rule by the ruling coalition in Malaysia (Barisan Nasional or BN, formerly the Alliance). Despite this result, the BN’s longevity and resilience to competition is remarkable. This book explores the mechanisms behind the emergence, endurance, fight for survival and decline of the party’s dominance. Using a systematic analysis of key resources (budgets, posts, and seats), Washida challenges the conventional argument that a punitive threat to exclude opposition supporters from distributive benefits sustained the loyalty of the masses as well as the elites. He also calls into question whether the mere existence of party organization in and of itself enables leaders to credibly commit to power-sharing. Instead he posits a theory of mobilization agency, in which a party leader needs to design an effective incentive mechanism. In addition, he explains how the BN had manufactured legislative dominance by tactical gerrymandering and malapportionment. The insights drawn from the Malaysian case can help deepen our understanding of the rise and fall of authoritarian parties and distributive politics in general.

Poverty Amidst Plenty

Author: Edward Weisband

Publisher: Westview Press

Published: 1989-03-14

Total Pages: 292

ISBN-13:

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Weisband (political science, SUNY-Binghamton) presents a group of readings designed for introductory and advanced level college courses in world political economy. His interpretive essays generate an interdisciplinary discussion, a synthesis of theoretical perspectives and value orientations, and provide students with a critical comprehension of the complex workings of the world economy. No index. No bibliography. Paperback edition ($17.95) not seen. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR

Book Synopsis Poverty Amidst Plenty by : Edward Weisband

Download or read book Poverty Amidst Plenty written by Edward Weisband and published by Westview Press. This book was released on 1989-03-14 with total page 292 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Weisband (political science, SUNY-Binghamton) presents a group of readings designed for introductory and advanced level college courses in world political economy. His interpretive essays generate an interdisciplinary discussion, a synthesis of theoretical perspectives and value orientations, and provide students with a critical comprehension of the complex workings of the world economy. No index. No bibliography. Paperback edition ($17.95) not seen. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR

Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism

Author: Susan C. Stokes

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Published: 2013-09-16

Total Pages: 343

ISBN-13: 1107435757

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Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism addresses major questions in distributive politics. Why is it acceptable for parties to try to win elections by promising to make certain groups of people better off, but unacceptable - and illegal - to pay people for their votes? Why do parties often lavish benefits on loyal voters, whose support they can count on anyway, rather than on responsive swing voters? Why is vote buying and machine politics common in today's developing democracies but a thing of the past in most of today's advanced democracies? This book develops a theory of broker-mediated distribution to answer these questions, testing the theory with research from four developing democracies, and reviews a rich secondary literature on countries in all world regions. The authors deploy normative theory to evaluate whether clientelism, pork-barrel politics, and other non-programmatic distributive strategies can be justified on the grounds that they promote efficiency, redistribution, or voter participation.

Book Synopsis Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism by : Susan C. Stokes

Download or read book Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism written by Susan C. Stokes and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2013-09-16 with total page 343 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism addresses major questions in distributive politics. Why is it acceptable for parties to try to win elections by promising to make certain groups of people better off, but unacceptable - and illegal - to pay people for their votes? Why do parties often lavish benefits on loyal voters, whose support they can count on anyway, rather than on responsive swing voters? Why is vote buying and machine politics common in today's developing democracies but a thing of the past in most of today's advanced democracies? This book develops a theory of broker-mediated distribution to answer these questions, testing the theory with research from four developing democracies, and reviews a rich secondary literature on countries in all world regions. The authors deploy normative theory to evaluate whether clientelism, pork-barrel politics, and other non-programmatic distributive strategies can be justified on the grounds that they promote efficiency, redistribution, or voter participation.