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This book addresses collective bargaining in an intertemporal monetary macroeconomy of the aggregate supply–aggregate demand (AS–AD) type with overlapping generations of consumers and with a public sector. The results are presented in a unified framework with a commodity market that clears competitively. By analyzing the implications of three variants of collective bargaining – efficient bargaining in a uniform and a segmented labor market and “right-to-manage” wage bargaining – it identifies the quantity of money, price expectations, union power, and union size as the determinants of temporary equilibria. In the three scenarios, it characterizes and compares the temporary equilibria using both analytical and numerical techniques, with an emphasis on allocations, welfare, and efficiency. It also discusses the dynamic evolution under rational expectations and its steady states in nominal and real terms. Lastly, it demonstrates conditions for stability regarding a balanced monetary expansion of the economy.
Book Synopsis Essays on Wage Bargaining in Dynamic Macroeconomics by : Oliver Claas
Download or read book Essays on Wage Bargaining in Dynamic Macroeconomics written by Oliver Claas and published by Springer Nature. This book was released on 2019-11-20 with total page 161 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book addresses collective bargaining in an intertemporal monetary macroeconomy of the aggregate supply–aggregate demand (AS–AD) type with overlapping generations of consumers and with a public sector. The results are presented in a unified framework with a commodity market that clears competitively. By analyzing the implications of three variants of collective bargaining – efficient bargaining in a uniform and a segmented labor market and “right-to-manage” wage bargaining – it identifies the quantity of money, price expectations, union power, and union size as the determinants of temporary equilibria. In the three scenarios, it characterizes and compares the temporary equilibria using both analytical and numerical techniques, with an emphasis on allocations, welfare, and efficiency. It also discusses the dynamic evolution under rational expectations and its steady states in nominal and real terms. Lastly, it demonstrates conditions for stability regarding a balanced monetary expansion of the economy.
This thesis consists of three chapters in empirical macroeconomics. In the first chapter, I study downward wage rigidity. Downward wage rigidity is central to many explanations of unemployment fluctuations. In benchmark models, the wage for new hires is particularly important, but there is limited evidence of downward rigidity on this margin. We introduce a dataset that tracks the wage for new hires at the job level -- across successive vacancies posted by the same job title and establishment. We show that the wage for new hires is rigid downward but flexible upward, in two steps. First, the nominal wage rarely changes at the job level. When wages do change, they fall infrequently, suggesting a constraint from below. Second, when unemployment rises, wages do not fall -- but wages do rise strongly as unemployment falls. We show that prior strategies, which study the average wage for new hires, cannot detect downward rigidity due to changing job composition. We then develop a tractable dynamic wage bargaining model with downward rigidity. We fit the model to our findings, and uncover state dependent asymmetry in unemployment dynamics. When there has been a contraction in the recent past, unemployment responds symmetrically to subsequent labor demand shocks; when there has recently been an expansion, unemployment is subsequently twice as sensitive to negative as to positive shocks. In the second chapter, I study the fall in the labor share. The labor share fell in the US and worldwide after the 1980s. This paper argues the falling labor share dampens unemployment fluctuations, in two steps. First, the paper studies a class of labor search models with capital. The falling labor share lowers the sensitivity of unemployment to labor demand shocks, regardless of whether rising capital or rising rents govern the labor share. The peak-to-trough fall in the US labor share lowers the sensitivity of unemployment to labor demand shocks by 30%. Second, the paper provides evidence for dampening. I exploit labor share variation within industries and between regions, to show that low labor share markets are less sensitive to the aggregate business cycle. Then I identify variation in the labor share using the passage of statewide reforms. After these reforms pass, the labor share falls, and state unemployment becomes less sensitive to aggregate business cycles. In the third chapter, I study systemic risk in the banking system. Banks face different but potentially correlated risks from outside the financial system. Financial connections can help hedge these risks, but also create the means by which shocks can propagate. We examine this tradeoff in the context of a new stylised fact we present: German banks are more likely to have financial connections when they face more similar risks -- potentially undermining the hedging role of financial connections and contributing to systemic risk. We find that such patterns are socially suboptimal, but can be explained by risk-shifting. Risk-shifting motivates banks to correlate their failures with their counterparties even though it creates systemic risk. JEL Codes E24, G21
Book Synopsis Essays on Empirical Macroeconomics by : Jonathon Hazell
Download or read book Essays on Empirical Macroeconomics written by Jonathon Hazell and published by . This book was released on 2020 with total page 342 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This thesis consists of three chapters in empirical macroeconomics. In the first chapter, I study downward wage rigidity. Downward wage rigidity is central to many explanations of unemployment fluctuations. In benchmark models, the wage for new hires is particularly important, but there is limited evidence of downward rigidity on this margin. We introduce a dataset that tracks the wage for new hires at the job level -- across successive vacancies posted by the same job title and establishment. We show that the wage for new hires is rigid downward but flexible upward, in two steps. First, the nominal wage rarely changes at the job level. When wages do change, they fall infrequently, suggesting a constraint from below. Second, when unemployment rises, wages do not fall -- but wages do rise strongly as unemployment falls. We show that prior strategies, which study the average wage for new hires, cannot detect downward rigidity due to changing job composition. We then develop a tractable dynamic wage bargaining model with downward rigidity. We fit the model to our findings, and uncover state dependent asymmetry in unemployment dynamics. When there has been a contraction in the recent past, unemployment responds symmetrically to subsequent labor demand shocks; when there has recently been an expansion, unemployment is subsequently twice as sensitive to negative as to positive shocks. In the second chapter, I study the fall in the labor share. The labor share fell in the US and worldwide after the 1980s. This paper argues the falling labor share dampens unemployment fluctuations, in two steps. First, the paper studies a class of labor search models with capital. The falling labor share lowers the sensitivity of unemployment to labor demand shocks, regardless of whether rising capital or rising rents govern the labor share. The peak-to-trough fall in the US labor share lowers the sensitivity of unemployment to labor demand shocks by 30%. Second, the paper provides evidence for dampening. I exploit labor share variation within industries and between regions, to show that low labor share markets are less sensitive to the aggregate business cycle. Then I identify variation in the labor share using the passage of statewide reforms. After these reforms pass, the labor share falls, and state unemployment becomes less sensitive to aggregate business cycles. In the third chapter, I study systemic risk in the banking system. Banks face different but potentially correlated risks from outside the financial system. Financial connections can help hedge these risks, but also create the means by which shocks can propagate. We examine this tradeoff in the context of a new stylised fact we present: German banks are more likely to have financial connections when they face more similar risks -- potentially undermining the hedging role of financial connections and contributing to systemic risk. We find that such patterns are socially suboptimal, but can be explained by risk-shifting. Risk-shifting motivates banks to correlate their failures with their counterparties even though it creates systemic risk. JEL Codes E24, G21
This dissertation contains three essays at the interaction between macroeconomics and the financial market, with an emphasis on macroeconomic implications of heterogeneous firms under financial frictions. My dissertation explores the relationships among financial market friction, firms' entry and exit behaviors, and job reallocation over the business cycle. Chapter 1 examines the macroeconomic effects of financial leverage and firms' endogenous entry and exit on job reallocation over the business cycle. Financial leverage and the extensive margin are the keys to explain job reallocation at both the firm-level and the aggregate level. I build a general equilibrium industry dynamics model with endogenous entry and exit, a frictional labor market, and borrowing constraints. The model provides a novel theory that financially constrained firms adjust employment more often. I characterize an analytical solution to the wage bargaining problem between a leveraged firm and workers. Higher financial leverage allows constrained firms to bargain for lower wages, but also induces higher default risks. In the model, firms adopt (S,s) employment decision rules. Because the entry and exit firms are more likely to be borrowing constrained, a negative shock affects the inaction regions of the entry and exit firms more than that of the incumbents. In the simulated model, the extensive margin explains 36% of the job reallocation volatility, which is very close to the data and is quantitatively significant. Chapter 2 investigates firms' financial behaviors and size distributions over the business cycle. We propose a general equilibrium industry dynamics model of firms' capital structure and entry and exit behaviors. The financial market frictions capture both the age dependence and size dependence of firms' size distributions. When we add the aggregate shocks to the model, it can account for the business cycle patterns of firm dynamics: 1) entry is more procyclical than exit; 2) debt is procyclical, and equity issuance is countercyclical; and 3) the cyclicalities of debt and equity issuance are negatively correlated with firm size and age. Chapter 3 studies the equilibrium pricing of complex securities in segmented markets by risk-averse expert investors who are subject to asset-specific risk. Investor expertise varies, and the investment technology of investors with more expertise is subject to less asset-specific risk. Expert demand lowers equilibrium required returns, reducing participation, and leading to endogenously segmented markets. Amongst participants, portfolio decisions and realized returns determine the joint distribution of financial expertise and financial wealth. This distribution, along with participation, then determines market-level risk bearing capacity. We show that more complex assets deliver higher equilibrium returns to expert participants. Moreover, we explain why complex assets can have lower overall participation despite higher market-level alphas and Sharpe ratios. Finally, we show how complexity affects the size distribution of complex asset investors in a way that is consistent with the size distribution of hedge funds.
Book Synopsis Essays on Macroeconomics and Firm Dynamics by : Lei Zhang
Download or read book Essays on Macroeconomics and Firm Dynamics written by Lei Zhang and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 192 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation contains three essays at the interaction between macroeconomics and the financial market, with an emphasis on macroeconomic implications of heterogeneous firms under financial frictions. My dissertation explores the relationships among financial market friction, firms' entry and exit behaviors, and job reallocation over the business cycle. Chapter 1 examines the macroeconomic effects of financial leverage and firms' endogenous entry and exit on job reallocation over the business cycle. Financial leverage and the extensive margin are the keys to explain job reallocation at both the firm-level and the aggregate level. I build a general equilibrium industry dynamics model with endogenous entry and exit, a frictional labor market, and borrowing constraints. The model provides a novel theory that financially constrained firms adjust employment more often. I characterize an analytical solution to the wage bargaining problem between a leveraged firm and workers. Higher financial leverage allows constrained firms to bargain for lower wages, but also induces higher default risks. In the model, firms adopt (S,s) employment decision rules. Because the entry and exit firms are more likely to be borrowing constrained, a negative shock affects the inaction regions of the entry and exit firms more than that of the incumbents. In the simulated model, the extensive margin explains 36% of the job reallocation volatility, which is very close to the data and is quantitatively significant. Chapter 2 investigates firms' financial behaviors and size distributions over the business cycle. We propose a general equilibrium industry dynamics model of firms' capital structure and entry and exit behaviors. The financial market frictions capture both the age dependence and size dependence of firms' size distributions. When we add the aggregate shocks to the model, it can account for the business cycle patterns of firm dynamics: 1) entry is more procyclical than exit; 2) debt is procyclical, and equity issuance is countercyclical; and 3) the cyclicalities of debt and equity issuance are negatively correlated with firm size and age. Chapter 3 studies the equilibrium pricing of complex securities in segmented markets by risk-averse expert investors who are subject to asset-specific risk. Investor expertise varies, and the investment technology of investors with more expertise is subject to less asset-specific risk. Expert demand lowers equilibrium required returns, reducing participation, and leading to endogenously segmented markets. Amongst participants, portfolio decisions and realized returns determine the joint distribution of financial expertise and financial wealth. This distribution, along with participation, then determines market-level risk bearing capacity. We show that more complex assets deliver higher equilibrium returns to expert participants. Moreover, we explain why complex assets can have lower overall participation despite higher market-level alphas and Sharpe ratios. Finally, we show how complexity affects the size distribution of complex asset investors in a way that is consistent with the size distribution of hedge funds.
This dissertation contributes towards the understanding of the macroeconomic effects of micro-level firm dynamics, in particular firm entry, exit, and innovation activities in driving aggregate economic dynamism and growth. It focuses on the frictions affecting firms in these activities when contracting with their managers and workers, as well as peers, and the corrective role policies can play. The dissertation consists of two chapters. The first chapter, "Restrictions on Executive Mobility and Reallocation: The Aggregate Effect of Non-Competition Contracts", assesses the aggregate effect of non-competition employment contracts, agreements that exclude employees from joining competing firms for a duration of time, in the managerial labor market. These contracts encourage firm investment but restrict manager mobility. To explore this tradeoff, I develop a dynamic contracting model in which firms use non-competition to enforce buyout payment when their managers are poached, ultimately extracting rent from outside firms. Such rent extraction encourages initial employing firms to undertake more investment, as they partially capture the external payoff, but distorts manager allocation. I show that the privately-optimal contract over-extracts rent by setting an excessively long non-competition duration. Therefore, restrictions on non-competition can improve efficiency. To quantitatively evaluate the theory, I assemble a new dataset on non-competition contracts for executives in U.S. public firms. Using the contract data, I find that executives under non-competition are associated with a lower separation rate and higher firm investment. I also provide new empirical evidence consistent with non-competition reducing wage-backloading in the model. The calibrated model suggests that the optimal restriction on non-competition duration is close to banning non-competition. The second chapter, "Knowledge Creation and Diffusion with Limited Appropriation" (joint with Hugo Hopenhayn), studies the interaction of innovation and imitation in driving economic growth. In relation to a series of recent papers in the macro literature have emphasized the interaction between the two forces, we introduce two key elements in considering the incentives to innovate versus imitate. First, we consider frictions in matching innovators and imitators in the process of knowledge diffusion. Second, while most of the recent literature assume that imitators capture the entire surplus from knowledge diffusion, we consider a general bargaining problem between the innovators and imitators in dividing surplus. In a simple one period model, we derive a Hosios condition for the optimal surplus division when firms are ex-ante homogeneous. But we also find that as the degree of firm heterogeneity increases, innovators' share of surplus must decrease to maximize growth, approaching zero for sufficiently large heterogeneity. Our calibrated dynamic model suggests that the optimal share of surplus innovators appropriate should be at the lower end, consistent with weak intellectual property rights.
Book Synopsis Essays on Macroeconomics and Firm Dynamics by : Liyan Shi
Download or read book Essays on Macroeconomics and Firm Dynamics written by Liyan Shi and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page 136 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation contributes towards the understanding of the macroeconomic effects of micro-level firm dynamics, in particular firm entry, exit, and innovation activities in driving aggregate economic dynamism and growth. It focuses on the frictions affecting firms in these activities when contracting with their managers and workers, as well as peers, and the corrective role policies can play. The dissertation consists of two chapters. The first chapter, "Restrictions on Executive Mobility and Reallocation: The Aggregate Effect of Non-Competition Contracts", assesses the aggregate effect of non-competition employment contracts, agreements that exclude employees from joining competing firms for a duration of time, in the managerial labor market. These contracts encourage firm investment but restrict manager mobility. To explore this tradeoff, I develop a dynamic contracting model in which firms use non-competition to enforce buyout payment when their managers are poached, ultimately extracting rent from outside firms. Such rent extraction encourages initial employing firms to undertake more investment, as they partially capture the external payoff, but distorts manager allocation. I show that the privately-optimal contract over-extracts rent by setting an excessively long non-competition duration. Therefore, restrictions on non-competition can improve efficiency. To quantitatively evaluate the theory, I assemble a new dataset on non-competition contracts for executives in U.S. public firms. Using the contract data, I find that executives under non-competition are associated with a lower separation rate and higher firm investment. I also provide new empirical evidence consistent with non-competition reducing wage-backloading in the model. The calibrated model suggests that the optimal restriction on non-competition duration is close to banning non-competition. The second chapter, "Knowledge Creation and Diffusion with Limited Appropriation" (joint with Hugo Hopenhayn), studies the interaction of innovation and imitation in driving economic growth. In relation to a series of recent papers in the macro literature have emphasized the interaction between the two forces, we introduce two key elements in considering the incentives to innovate versus imitate. First, we consider frictions in matching innovators and imitators in the process of knowledge diffusion. Second, while most of the recent literature assume that imitators capture the entire surplus from knowledge diffusion, we consider a general bargaining problem between the innovators and imitators in dividing surplus. In a simple one period model, we derive a Hosios condition for the optimal surplus division when firms are ex-ante homogeneous. But we also find that as the degree of firm heterogeneity increases, innovators' share of surplus must decrease to maximize growth, approaching zero for sufficiently large heterogeneity. Our calibrated dynamic model suggests that the optimal share of surplus innovators appropriate should be at the lower end, consistent with weak intellectual property rights.
Book Synopsis Essays on Collective Bargaining, Wage Inequality and Firm Dynamics by : Juraj Briškár
Download or read book Essays on Collective Bargaining, Wage Inequality and Firm Dynamics written by Juraj Briškár and published by . This book was released on 2021 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Wage bargaining, risk-sharing and empolyment by : Jaakko Kiander
Download or read book Wage bargaining, risk-sharing and empolyment written by Jaakko Kiander and published by . This book was released on 1994 with total page 114 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Wage Bargaining, Risk-sharing and Employment by : Jaakko Kiander
Download or read book Wage Bargaining, Risk-sharing and Employment written by Jaakko Kiander and published by . This book was released on 1994 with total page 114 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
In addition to making original contributions to the fields of applied labor economics and labor studies, it is our hope that they also offer frameworks upon which future research in these areas can build.
Book Synopsis Essays in the Economics of Collective Bargaining and Labor Market Power by : Matthew Mazewski
Download or read book Essays in the Economics of Collective Bargaining and Labor Market Power written by Matthew Mazewski and published by . This book was released on 2022 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In addition to making original contributions to the fields of applied labor economics and labor studies, it is our hope that they also offer frameworks upon which future research in these areas can build.
Book Synopsis Essay on Marxian Economics by : Joan Robinson
Download or read book Essay on Marxian Economics written by Joan Robinson and published by Springer. This book was released on 1967-02-01 with total page 128 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
This textbook offers a unique approach to macroeconomic theory built on microeconomic foundations of monetary macroeconomics within a unified framework of an intertemporal general equilibrium model extended to a sequential and dynamic analysis. It investigates the implications of expectations and of stationary fiscal policies on allocations, on the quantity of money, and on the dynamic evolution of the economy with and without noise. The text contrasts and compares the two main competing approaches in macroeconomics within the same intertemporal model of a closed monetary economy: the one postulating full price flexibility to guarantee equilibrium in all markets at all times under perfect foresight or rational expectations, versus the so called disequilibrium approach where trading occurs at non- market-clearing prices and wages when these adjust sluggishly from period to period in response to market disequilibrium signals.
Book Synopsis Macroeconomic Theory by : Volker Böhm
Download or read book Macroeconomic Theory written by Volker Böhm and published by Springer. This book was released on 2017-10-30 with total page 423 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This textbook offers a unique approach to macroeconomic theory built on microeconomic foundations of monetary macroeconomics within a unified framework of an intertemporal general equilibrium model extended to a sequential and dynamic analysis. It investigates the implications of expectations and of stationary fiscal policies on allocations, on the quantity of money, and on the dynamic evolution of the economy with and without noise. The text contrasts and compares the two main competing approaches in macroeconomics within the same intertemporal model of a closed monetary economy: the one postulating full price flexibility to guarantee equilibrium in all markets at all times under perfect foresight or rational expectations, versus the so called disequilibrium approach where trading occurs at non- market-clearing prices and wages when these adjust sluggishly from period to period in response to market disequilibrium signals.
