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Book Synopsis Generic drug entry prior to patent expiration an FTC study by :
Download or read book Generic drug entry prior to patent expiration an FTC study written by and published by DIANE Publishing. This book was released on 2002 with total page 129 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patient Expiration by : United States. Federal Trade Commission
Download or read book Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patient Expiration written by United States. Federal Trade Commission and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 136 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
"In April 2001, the Commission began an industry-wide study focused on certain aspects of generic drug competition under the Hatch-Waxman Amendments. The Amendments provide certain methods by which generic drug manufacturers can obtain approval to market a generic version of a brand-name product. The study's purpose was to provide a more complete picture of how generic drug competition has developed under one method the Amendments established: generic entry prior to expiration of the brand-name company's patents on the relevant drug product. This report sets forth the results of the study. The study was prompted, in part, by the Commission's enforcement actions against alleged anticompetitive agreements that relied on certain Hatch-Waxman provisions. The study was designed to determine whether such agreements are isolated instances or more typical, and whether particular provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments are susceptible to strategies to delay or deter consumer access to low-cost generic alternatives to brand-name drug products." -- from the Introduction, p. 1.
Book Synopsis Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration by : United States. Federal Trade Commission
Download or read book Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration written by United States. Federal Trade Commission and published by William s Hein & Company. This book was released on 2002-01-01 with total page 113 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: "In April 2001, the Commission began an industry-wide study focused on certain aspects of generic drug competition under the Hatch-Waxman Amendments. The Amendments provide certain methods by which generic drug manufacturers can obtain approval to market a generic version of a brand-name product. The study's purpose was to provide a more complete picture of how generic drug competition has developed under one method the Amendments established: generic entry prior to expiration of the brand-name company's patents on the relevant drug product. This report sets forth the results of the study. The study was prompted, in part, by the Commission's enforcement actions against alleged anticompetitive agreements that relied on certain Hatch-Waxman provisions. The study was designed to determine whether such agreements are isolated instances or more typical, and whether particular provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments are susceptible to strategies to delay or deter consumer access to low-cost generic alternatives to brand-name drug products." -- from the Introduction, p. 1.
Book Synopsis Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration by : United States. Federal Trade Commission
Download or read book Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration written by United States. Federal Trade Commission and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Examining Issues Related to Competition in the Pharmaceutical Marketplace by : United States. Congress. House. Committee on Energy and Commerce. Subcommittee on Health
Download or read book Examining Issues Related to Competition in the Pharmaceutical Marketplace written by United States. Congress. House. Committee on Energy and Commerce. Subcommittee on Health and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 152 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
This dissertation examines the law and economics of generic drug entry, and the problems that arise from specific U.S. regulatory arrangements that govern innovation and competition in the market for patented pharmaceuticals. As Chapter 1 explains, competitive entry by generic drug makers is limited by both patents and industry-specific regulation, which together provide the means for brand-name drug makers to avoid competition and thereby recoup large investments in research, development, and testing. At the same time, the complex rules of the Hatch-Waxman Act furnish a pathway by which generic drug makers may challenge the validity or scope of brand-name patents, with a view to entering the market with a competing product prior to patent expiration. The subsequent chapters examine several aspects of the competitive interaction between brand-name and generic drug makers. Chapter 2 analyzes settlements of patent litigation between brand-name and generic drug makers, in which the brand-name firm pays the generic firm in exchange for delayed market entry. Such pay-for-delay settlements are an important, unresolved question in U.S. antitrust policy. The analysis reveals that the pay-for-delay settlement problem is more severe than has been commonly understood. Several specific features of the Act—in particular, a 180-day bounty granted to certain generic drug makers as an incentive to pursue pre-expiration entry—widen the potential for anticompetitive harm from pay-for-delay settlements, compared to the usual understanding. In addition, I show that settlements are "innovation inefficient" as a means of providing profits and hence ex ante innovation incentives to brand-name drug makers. To the extent that Congress established a preferred tradeoff between innovation and competition when it passed the Act, settlements that implement a different, less competition-protective tradeoff are particularly problematic from an antitrust standpoint. Chapter 3 synthesizes available public information about pay-for-delay settlements in order to offer a new account of the extent and evolution of settlement practice. The analysis draws upon a novel dataset of 143 such settlements. The analysis uncovers an evolution in the means by which a brand-name firm can pay a generic firm to delay entry, including a variety of complex "side deals" by which a brand-name firm can compensate a generic firm in a disguised fashion. It also reveals several novel forms of regulatory avoidance. The analysis in the chapter suggests that, as a matter of institutional choice, an expert agency is in a relatively good position to conduct the aggregate analysis needed to identify an optimal antitrust rule. Chapter 4 examines the co-evolution of increased brand-name patenting and increased generic pre-expiration challenges. It draws upon a second novel dataset of drug approvals, applications, patents, and other drug characteristics. Its first contribution is to chart the growth of patent portfolios and pre-expiration challenges. Over time, patenting has increased, measured by the number of patents per drug and the length of the nominal patent term. During the same period, challenges have increased as well, and drugs are challenged sooner, relative to brand-name approval. The analysis shows that brand-name sales, a proxy for the profitability of the drug, have a positive effect on the likelihood of generic challenge, consistent with the view that patents that later prove to be valuable receive greater ex post scrutiny. The likelihood of challenge also varies by patent type and timing of expiration. Conditional on sales and other drug characteristics, drugs with weaker patents, particularly those that expire later than a drug's basic compound patent, face a significantly higher likelihood of challenge. Though the welfare implications of Hatch-Waxman patent challenge provisions are complicated, these results suggest these challenges serve a useful purpose, in promoting scrutiny of low quality and late-expiring patents.
Book Synopsis The Law and Economics of Generic Drug Regulation by : Christopher Scott Hemphill
Download or read book The Law and Economics of Generic Drug Regulation written by Christopher Scott Hemphill and published by Stanford University. This book was released on 2010 with total page 249 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation examines the law and economics of generic drug entry, and the problems that arise from specific U.S. regulatory arrangements that govern innovation and competition in the market for patented pharmaceuticals. As Chapter 1 explains, competitive entry by generic drug makers is limited by both patents and industry-specific regulation, which together provide the means for brand-name drug makers to avoid competition and thereby recoup large investments in research, development, and testing. At the same time, the complex rules of the Hatch-Waxman Act furnish a pathway by which generic drug makers may challenge the validity or scope of brand-name patents, with a view to entering the market with a competing product prior to patent expiration. The subsequent chapters examine several aspects of the competitive interaction between brand-name and generic drug makers. Chapter 2 analyzes settlements of patent litigation between brand-name and generic drug makers, in which the brand-name firm pays the generic firm in exchange for delayed market entry. Such pay-for-delay settlements are an important, unresolved question in U.S. antitrust policy. The analysis reveals that the pay-for-delay settlement problem is more severe than has been commonly understood. Several specific features of the Act—in particular, a 180-day bounty granted to certain generic drug makers as an incentive to pursue pre-expiration entry—widen the potential for anticompetitive harm from pay-for-delay settlements, compared to the usual understanding. In addition, I show that settlements are "innovation inefficient" as a means of providing profits and hence ex ante innovation incentives to brand-name drug makers. To the extent that Congress established a preferred tradeoff between innovation and competition when it passed the Act, settlements that implement a different, less competition-protective tradeoff are particularly problematic from an antitrust standpoint. Chapter 3 synthesizes available public information about pay-for-delay settlements in order to offer a new account of the extent and evolution of settlement practice. The analysis draws upon a novel dataset of 143 such settlements. The analysis uncovers an evolution in the means by which a brand-name firm can pay a generic firm to delay entry, including a variety of complex "side deals" by which a brand-name firm can compensate a generic firm in a disguised fashion. It also reveals several novel forms of regulatory avoidance. The analysis in the chapter suggests that, as a matter of institutional choice, an expert agency is in a relatively good position to conduct the aggregate analysis needed to identify an optimal antitrust rule. Chapter 4 examines the co-evolution of increased brand-name patenting and increased generic pre-expiration challenges. It draws upon a second novel dataset of drug approvals, applications, patents, and other drug characteristics. Its first contribution is to chart the growth of patent portfolios and pre-expiration challenges. Over time, patenting has increased, measured by the number of patents per drug and the length of the nominal patent term. During the same period, challenges have increased as well, and drugs are challenged sooner, relative to brand-name approval. The analysis shows that brand-name sales, a proxy for the profitability of the drug, have a positive effect on the likelihood of generic challenge, consistent with the view that patents that later prove to be valuable receive greater ex post scrutiny. The likelihood of challenge also varies by patent type and timing of expiration. Conditional on sales and other drug characteristics, drugs with weaker patents, particularly those that expire later than a drug's basic compound patent, face a significantly higher likelihood of challenge. Though the welfare implications of Hatch-Waxman patent challenge provisions are complicated, these results suggest these challenges serve a useful purpose, in promoting scrutiny of low quality and late-expiring patents.
Book Synopsis Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patient Expiration by : United States. Federal Trade Commission
Download or read book Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patient Expiration written by United States. Federal Trade Commission and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Completely updated, the new Eighth Edition of Generic and Innovator Drugs: A Guide to FDA Approval Requirements provides indispensable and practical insights into the FDA approval process. Youand’ll find comprehensive coverage of: Abbreviated new drug applications 505(b)(2) new drug applications Delaying approval of competing products FDA approval of biologic drugs No other book can cover the drug approval process as thoroughly, answering important questions like these: What is required to extend the patent of an FDA-approved product? When must a generic manufacturer notify the innovator manufacturer when submitting an ANDA or 505(b)(2) application? When does the FDA delay approvals because of patent claims, and when does it ignore patents? How can one challenge an FDA exclusivity decision? When can a manufacturer safely sell a drug without prior FDA approval? In what circumstances can a generic manufacturer obtain FDA permission to file an ANDA for a variant of an existing drug? When will the FDA waive or reduce prescription drug user fees? How can a company or an individual avoid debarment? What steps are necessary to comply with the FDAand’s Fraud Policy? When and how can a drug company take advantage of FDA accelerated approval procedures? What are the labeling requirements for exporting approved drugs? How have the changes made by the FDA Safety and Innovation Act, including the Prescription Drug User Fee Act, the Generic Drug User Fee Amendments and the Biosimilars User Fee Act, and the Generating Antibiotic Incentives Now Act affected the overall statutory scheme? Generic and Innovator Drugs: A Guide to FDA Approval Requirements, Eighth Edition provides step-by-step guidance of the approval process and expert interpretation of: The Hatch-Waxman Act (Drug Price Competition and Patent Restoration Act) The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act The Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act The FDA Export Reform and Enhancement Act The Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act And more! AUTHOR NOTE Donald O. Beersand’ contributions to this publication were completed before he rejoined the Food and Drug Administration. He has had no part in writing and revising this Eighth Edition.
Book Synopsis Generic and Innovator Drugs by : Donald O. Beers
Download or read book Generic and Innovator Drugs written by Donald O. Beers and published by Wolters Kluwer. This book was released on 2013-05-22 with total page 2154 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Completely updated, the new Eighth Edition of Generic and Innovator Drugs: A Guide to FDA Approval Requirements provides indispensable and practical insights into the FDA approval process. Youand’ll find comprehensive coverage of: Abbreviated new drug applications 505(b)(2) new drug applications Delaying approval of competing products FDA approval of biologic drugs No other book can cover the drug approval process as thoroughly, answering important questions like these: What is required to extend the patent of an FDA-approved product? When must a generic manufacturer notify the innovator manufacturer when submitting an ANDA or 505(b)(2) application? When does the FDA delay approvals because of patent claims, and when does it ignore patents? How can one challenge an FDA exclusivity decision? When can a manufacturer safely sell a drug without prior FDA approval? In what circumstances can a generic manufacturer obtain FDA permission to file an ANDA for a variant of an existing drug? When will the FDA waive or reduce prescription drug user fees? How can a company or an individual avoid debarment? What steps are necessary to comply with the FDAand’s Fraud Policy? When and how can a drug company take advantage of FDA accelerated approval procedures? What are the labeling requirements for exporting approved drugs? How have the changes made by the FDA Safety and Innovation Act, including the Prescription Drug User Fee Act, the Generic Drug User Fee Amendments and the Biosimilars User Fee Act, and the Generating Antibiotic Incentives Now Act affected the overall statutory scheme? Generic and Innovator Drugs: A Guide to FDA Approval Requirements, Eighth Edition provides step-by-step guidance of the approval process and expert interpretation of: The Hatch-Waxman Act (Drug Price Competition and Patent Restoration Act) The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act The Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act The FDA Export Reform and Enhancement Act The Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act And more! AUTHOR NOTE Donald O. Beersand’ contributions to this publication were completed before he rejoined the Food and Drug Administration. He has had no part in writing and revising this Eighth Edition.
Book Synopsis How Increased Competition from Generic Drugs Has Affected Prices and Returns in the Pharmaceutical Industry by :
Download or read book How Increased Competition from Generic Drugs Has Affected Prices and Returns in the Pharmaceutical Industry written by and published by U.S. Government Printing Office. This book was released on 1998 with total page 94 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Pay to Delay by : United States. Congress. House. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Courts and Competition Policy
Download or read book Pay to Delay written by United States. Congress. House. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Courts and Competition Policy and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 184 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: