Author: David Fitzgerald

Publisher:

Published: 2010

Total Pages: 326

ISBN-13:

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This thesis is a study of how the lessons of the Vietnam War influenced US Army attitudes towards counterinsurgency in the post-Vietnam era, with a particular interest in the interplay between military doctrine and history. By looking at the evolution of doctrine over an extended period, this thesis demonstrates that Vietnam had a profound and continuing effect on Army attitudes towards counterinsurgency and that the Army{u2019}s lessons of Vietnam were fluid, contested and changeable. The Army only partially embraced counterinsurgency doctrine during the Vietnam War, applying it unevenly and with little lasting success. Defeat in Vietnam meant that whatever understanding the Army had of how to conduct counterinsurgency was discarded, as the institution consciously turned away from its Vietnam experience and constructed a set of {u2018}lessons of Vietnam{u2019} that eschewed such interventions. Ironically, the Army could escape neither Vietnam nor counterinsurgency and subsequent experiences modified its understanding of both. The thesis argues that these accumulated lessons of Vietnam influenced American conduct of counterinsurgency in the Iraq War (2003- ) and that the needs of that war subsequently led to a reconsideration of the importance of counterinsurgency and yet another iteration of the lessons of Vietnam. By examining the {u2018}history of the lesson{u2019} of Vietnam through the Army{u2019}s doctrine {u2013} as expressed in field manuals, service school curricula, official histories and professional military journals {u2013}this thesis addresses the question of how these lessons are constructed and used, a question that speaks to how histories are created and for what purpose. Certainly, the Army{u2019}s consensus on the lessons of Vietnam shifted as the needs of contemporary operations dictated; therefore, the lessons themselves changed with exigencies of the moment. The Army{u2019}s experience in Iraq is a useful case study of how an organization can reshape its historical memory to make it more useful to present challenges.

Download or read book Learning to Forget? written by David Fitzgerald and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 326 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This thesis is a study of how the lessons of the Vietnam War influenced US Army attitudes towards counterinsurgency in the post-Vietnam era, with a particular interest in the interplay between military doctrine and history. By looking at the evolution of doctrine over an extended period, this thesis demonstrates that Vietnam had a profound and continuing effect on Army attitudes towards counterinsurgency and that the Army{u2019}s lessons of Vietnam were fluid, contested and changeable. The Army only partially embraced counterinsurgency doctrine during the Vietnam War, applying it unevenly and with little lasting success. Defeat in Vietnam meant that whatever understanding the Army had of how to conduct counterinsurgency was discarded, as the institution consciously turned away from its Vietnam experience and constructed a set of {u2018}lessons of Vietnam{u2019} that eschewed such interventions. Ironically, the Army could escape neither Vietnam nor counterinsurgency and subsequent experiences modified its understanding of both. The thesis argues that these accumulated lessons of Vietnam influenced American conduct of counterinsurgency in the Iraq War (2003- ) and that the needs of that war subsequently led to a reconsideration of the importance of counterinsurgency and yet another iteration of the lessons of Vietnam. By examining the {u2018}history of the lesson{u2019} of Vietnam through the Army{u2019}s doctrine {u2013} as expressed in field manuals, service school curricula, official histories and professional military journals {u2013}this thesis addresses the question of how these lessons are constructed and used, a question that speaks to how histories are created and for what purpose. Certainly, the Army{u2019}s consensus on the lessons of Vietnam shifted as the needs of contemporary operations dictated; therefore, the lessons themselves changed with exigencies of the moment. The Army{u2019}s experience in Iraq is a useful case study of how an organization can reshape its historical memory to make it more useful to present challenges.