Download Is Fiscal Policy Coordination In Emu Desirable full books in PDF, epub, and Kindle. Read online Is Fiscal Policy Coordination In Emu Desirable ebook anywhere anytime directly on your device. Fast Download speed and no annoying ads. We cannot guarantee that every ebooks is available!
Book Synopsis Is Fiscal Policy Coordination in EMU Desirable? by : Roel M. W. J. Beetsma
Download or read book Is Fiscal Policy Coordination in EMU Desirable? written by Roel M. W. J. Beetsma and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page 50 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
It is widely argued that Europe`s unified monetary policy calls for international coordination at the fiscal level. We survey the issues involved in such coordination in the perspective of macroeconomic stabilization. A simple model identifies the circumstances under which coordination may be desirable. Coordination is beneficial when the cross-country correlation of the shocks is low. However given the potentially adverse reaction by the ECB (as a result of free-riding or a conflict on the orientation of the policy mix) fiscal coordination is likely to prove counterproductive when demand or supply shocks are highly symmetric across countries and the governments are unable to acquire a strategic leadership position vis-agrave;-vis the ECB.
Book Synopsis Is Fiscal Policy Coordination in Emu Desirable? by : Roel M. W. J. Beetsma
Download or read book Is Fiscal Policy Coordination in Emu Desirable? written by Roel M. W. J. Beetsma and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 45 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: It is widely argued that Europe`s unified monetary policy calls for international coordination at the fiscal level. We survey the issues involved in such coordination in the perspective of macroeconomic stabilization. A simple model identifies the circumstances under which coordination may be desirable. Coordination is beneficial when the cross-country correlation of the shocks is low. However given the potentially adverse reaction by the ECB (as a result of free-riding or a conflict on the orientation of the policy mix) fiscal coordination is likely to prove counterproductive when demand or supply shocks are highly symmetric across countries and the governments are unable to acquire a strategic leadership position vis-agrave;-vis the ECB.
Leading scholars and policy makers examine the challenges that are facing economic policies in the EMU today.
Book Synopsis Monetary and Fiscal Policies in EMU by : Marco Buti
Download or read book Monetary and Fiscal Policies in EMU written by Marco Buti and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2003-11-13 with total page 376 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Leading scholars and policy makers examine the challenges that are facing economic policies in the EMU today.
Book Synopsis Is policy coordination in EMU desirable ? by : Roel Beetsma
Download or read book Is policy coordination in EMU desirable ? written by Roel Beetsma and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page 44 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Structural Distortions and Decentralized Fiscal Policies in EMU by : Roel M. W. J. Beetsma
Download or read book Structural Distortions and Decentralized Fiscal Policies in EMU written by Roel M. W. J. Beetsma and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page 78 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Monetary and Fiscal Policy Coordination and Macroeconomic Stabilization by : Luca Lambertini
Download or read book Monetary and Fiscal Policy Coordination and Macroeconomic Stabilization written by Luca Lambertini and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 34 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
We examine, in a suitable theoretical framework, the relations between monetary and fiscal policies within the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Our stylized setup of EMU includes the following political agents, each endowed with an objective function: (i) A central authority (EC), which aims at maximizing a Social Welfare criterion; (ii) National Fiscal Authorities (FA), which pursue domestic output stabilization, (iii) the European Central Bank (ECB) which has a mandate to stabilize inflation. In this context we ask the following questions: - How would the EC want to direct (or coordinate) the national FA? - Do the EC decisions make control of inflation (the ECB mandate) easier or more difficult? - Do national FA have an incentive to obey to or to deviate from the EC directives? In response to the last question, our main result is that national FA may have an incentive to deviate, even if we exclude time-inconsistent motives in their preference functions, or motives linked to a failure to internalize aggregate demand spillovers. In particular, even in the absence of asymmetric shocks and of aggregate demand spillovers, EC authorities and national governments may have conflicting incentives, depending upon the relative size of disturbances to aggregate demand and supply. When both aggregate demand and supply shocks are positive (resp. negative) and the latter are large enough in absolute terms, then national governments will pursue a more expansionary (resp. contractionary) fiscal policy than it would be desirable from the point of view of social welfare. Our results imply that, if the EC authorities are required to enforce a social welfare function defined over aggregate output and inflation, then it may be necessary to endow the EC with appropriate enforcement devices with respect to the fiscal policy stance of individual member countries. This points to the necessity of having institutions (such as the Stability and Growth Pact, SGP) which help to coordinate and discipline the fiscal stance of member countries. While we do not discuss the specific provisions of the SGP, our conclusions strongly support the idea that the setting of fiscal policies by member countries needs to be disciplined, and in some instances possibly over-ruled, by the EC authorities.
Book Synopsis Independent Or Coordinated? Monetary and Fiscal Policy in Emu by : Luca Lambertini
Download or read book Independent Or Coordinated? Monetary and Fiscal Policy in Emu written by Luca Lambertini and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We examine, in a suitable theoretical framework, the relations between monetary and fiscal policies within the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Our stylized setup of EMU includes the following political agents, each endowed with an objective function: (i) A central authority (EC), which aims at maximizing a Social Welfare criterion; (ii) National Fiscal Authorities (FA), which pursue domestic output stabilization, (iii) the European Central Bank (ECB) which has a mandate to stabilize inflation. In this context we ask the following questions: - How would the EC want to direct (or coordinate) the national FA? - Do the EC decisions make control of inflation (the ECB mandate) easier or more difficult? - Do national FA have an incentive to obey to or to deviate from the EC directives? In response to the last question, our main result is that national FA may have an incentive to deviate, even if we exclude time-inconsistent motives in their preference functions, or motives linked to a failure to internalize aggregate demand spillovers. In particular, even in the absence of asymmetric shocks and of aggregate demand spillovers, EC authorities and national governments may have conflicting incentives, depending upon the relative size of disturbances to aggregate demand and supply. When both aggregate demand and supply shocks are positive (resp. negative) and the latter are large enough in absolute terms, then national governments will pursue a more expansionary (resp. contractionary) fiscal policy than it would be desirable from the point of view of social welfare. Our results imply that, if the EC authorities are required to enforce a social welfare function defined over aggregate output and inflation, then it may be necessary to endow the EC with appropriate enforcement devices with respect to the fiscal policy stance of individual member countries. This points to the necessity of having institutions (such as the Stability and Growth Pact, SGP) which help to coordinate and discipline the fiscal stance of member countries. While we do not discuss the specific provisions of the SGP, our conclusions strongly support the idea that the setting of fiscal policies by member countries needs to be disciplined, and in some instances possibly over-ruled, by the EC authorities.
Book Synopsis Fiscal policy coordination and EMU by : Andrew Brociner
Download or read book Fiscal policy coordination and EMU written by Andrew Brociner and published by . This book was released on 1992 with total page 48 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Recently, monetary authorities have increasingly focused on implementing policies to ensure price stability and strengthen central bank independence. Simultaneously, in the fiscal area, market development has allowed public debt managers to focus more on cost minimization. This “divorce” of monetary and debt management functions in no way lessens the need for effective coordination of monetary and fiscal policy if overall economic performance is to be optimized and maintained in the long term. This paper analyzes these issues based on a review of the relevant literature and of country experiences from an institutional and operational perspective.
Book Synopsis Coordination of Monetary and Fiscal Policies by : International Monetary Fund
Download or read book Coordination of Monetary and Fiscal Policies written by International Monetary Fund and published by International Monetary Fund. This book was released on 1998-03-01 with total page 33 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Recently, monetary authorities have increasingly focused on implementing policies to ensure price stability and strengthen central bank independence. Simultaneously, in the fiscal area, market development has allowed public debt managers to focus more on cost minimization. This “divorce” of monetary and debt management functions in no way lessens the need for effective coordination of monetary and fiscal policy if overall economic performance is to be optimized and maintained in the long term. This paper analyzes these issues based on a review of the relevant literature and of country experiences from an institutional and operational perspective.
Book Synopsis Is Fiscal Policy Coordination in EMU Desiderable? by : Roel Beetsma
Download or read book Is Fiscal Policy Coordination in EMU Desiderable? written by Roel Beetsma and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page 44 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: