Download Moral Hazard Effects In Health Insurance An Empirical Perspective full books in PDF, epub, and Kindle. Read online Moral Hazard Effects In Health Insurance An Empirical Perspective ebook anywhere anytime directly on your device. Fast Download speed and no annoying ads. We cannot guarantee that every ebooks is available!
Seminar paper from the year 2014 in the subject Business economics - Economic Policy, grade: 1,3, University of Kassel, language: English, abstract: Within the discussion about the increasing expenditures in health insurance, the overutilization of medical care is often attributed to the existence of a moral hazard problem. Since moral hazard has a great impact on health insurance policies, there is a growing interest in the economic literature to identify and to measure its effects. Although the problem of overconsumption of medical care does not mean moral hazard per se, the determination of the latter may reduce its scope and help to mitigate the problem of overutilization. The main objective of this paper is an empirical evidence of the moral hazard phenomenon. By analysing the economic literature on moral hazard in health insurance this paper seeks for examples of its empirical evidence, whereby the emphasis lies on distinguishing between the demand-oriented (especially ex-post) and the supply-oriented (external) moral hazard.
Book Synopsis Moral Hazard Effects in Health Insurance by : Olesya Kazantseva
Download or read book Moral Hazard Effects in Health Insurance written by Olesya Kazantseva and published by GRIN Verlag. This book was released on 2014-07-18 with total page 14 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Seminar paper from the year 2014 in the subject Business economics - Economic Policy, grade: 1,3, University of Kassel, language: English, abstract: Within the discussion about the increasing expenditures in health insurance, the overutilization of medical care is often attributed to the existence of a moral hazard problem. Since moral hazard has a great impact on health insurance policies, there is a growing interest in the economic literature to identify and to measure its effects. Although the problem of overconsumption of medical care does not mean moral hazard per se, the determination of the latter may reduce its scope and help to mitigate the problem of overutilization. The main objective of this paper is an empirical evidence of the moral hazard phenomenon. By analysing the economic literature on moral hazard in health insurance this paper seeks for examples of its empirical evidence, whereby the emphasis lies on distinguishing between the demand-oriented (especially ex-post) and the supply-oriented (external) moral hazard.
Seminar paper from the year 2016 in the subject Business economics - Banking, Stock Exchanges, Insurance, Accounting, grade: 1,3, University of Kassel, language: English, abstract: In the discussion about cost increase for German health care, the existence of a moral hazard problem is often mentioned. A bigger part of the costs are ascribed to the insured persons ́ behavior or lifestyle. The insured person is led to an increased demand of medical services than without an insurance. But also doctors or pharmacists may be evidenced „unethical“ behavior on the part of supply-induced demand. Is it really an unethical or rather a rational behavior? Which experiences have been made with a higher self-participation of the insured people? In which context stay health care services and price elasticity? And how can you reduce the problem of moral hazard? These are just a few questions which will be examined in this paper. The first chapter begins with health insurance in general and explains the benefits and the risks of being insured. The second chapter gives a generally valid definition of moral hazard as well as in terms of health insurance in particular. The third chapter shows the empirical perspective from the point of view of insured people and doctors. Thereby, it will enlarge on the RAND experiment and the price elasticity in the German market. The fourth chapter gives a few solutions for moral hazard effects, whereby solutions for insured people and for alternative financing are here in the focus. The last chapter will give a conclusion to the discussed topic.
Book Synopsis Moral Hazard Effects in Health Insurance. An Empirical Perspective by : Anke Höhmann
Download or read book Moral Hazard Effects in Health Insurance. An Empirical Perspective written by Anke Höhmann and published by GRIN Verlag. This book was released on 2017-06-12 with total page 26 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Seminar paper from the year 2016 in the subject Business economics - Banking, Stock Exchanges, Insurance, Accounting, grade: 1,3, University of Kassel, language: English, abstract: In the discussion about cost increase for German health care, the existence of a moral hazard problem is often mentioned. A bigger part of the costs are ascribed to the insured persons ́ behavior or lifestyle. The insured person is led to an increased demand of medical services than without an insurance. But also doctors or pharmacists may be evidenced „unethical“ behavior on the part of supply-induced demand. Is it really an unethical or rather a rational behavior? Which experiences have been made with a higher self-participation of the insured people? In which context stay health care services and price elasticity? And how can you reduce the problem of moral hazard? These are just a few questions which will be examined in this paper. The first chapter begins with health insurance in general and explains the benefits and the risks of being insured. The second chapter gives a generally valid definition of moral hazard as well as in terms of health insurance in particular. The third chapter shows the empirical perspective from the point of view of insured people and doctors. Thereby, it will enlarge on the RAND experiment and the price elasticity in the German market. The fourth chapter gives a few solutions for moral hazard effects, whereby solutions for insured people and for alternative financing are here in the focus. The last chapter will give a conclusion to the discussed topic.
Addressing the challenge of covering heath care expenses—while minimizing economic risks. Moral hazard—the tendency to change behavior when the cost of that behavior will be borne by others—is a particularly tricky question when considering health care. Kenneth J. Arrow’s seminal 1963 paper on this topic (included in this volume) was one of the first to explore the implication of moral hazard for health care, and Amy Finkelstein—recognized as one of the world’s foremost experts on the topic—here examines this issue in the context of contemporary American health care policy. Drawing on research from both the original RAND Health Insurance Experiment and her own research, including a 2008 Health Insurance Experiment in Oregon, Finkelstein presents compelling evidence that health insurance does indeed affect medical spending and encourages policy solutions that acknowledge and account for this. The volume also features commentaries and insights from other renowned economists, including an introduction by Joseph P. Newhouse that provides context for the discussion, a commentary from Jonathan Gruber that considers provider-side moral hazard, and reflections from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth J. Arrow. “Reads like a fireside chat among a group of distinguished, articulate health economists.” —Choice
Book Synopsis Moral Hazard in Health Insurance by : Amy Finkelstein
Download or read book Moral Hazard in Health Insurance written by Amy Finkelstein and published by Columbia University Press. This book was released on 2014-12-02 with total page 161 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Addressing the challenge of covering heath care expenses—while minimizing economic risks. Moral hazard—the tendency to change behavior when the cost of that behavior will be borne by others—is a particularly tricky question when considering health care. Kenneth J. Arrow’s seminal 1963 paper on this topic (included in this volume) was one of the first to explore the implication of moral hazard for health care, and Amy Finkelstein—recognized as one of the world’s foremost experts on the topic—here examines this issue in the context of contemporary American health care policy. Drawing on research from both the original RAND Health Insurance Experiment and her own research, including a 2008 Health Insurance Experiment in Oregon, Finkelstein presents compelling evidence that health insurance does indeed affect medical spending and encourages policy solutions that acknowledge and account for this. The volume also features commentaries and insights from other renowned economists, including an introduction by Joseph P. Newhouse that provides context for the discussion, a commentary from Jonathan Gruber that considers provider-side moral hazard, and reflections from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth J. Arrow. “Reads like a fireside chat among a group of distinguished, articulate health economists.” —Choice
Why do people buy health insurance? Conventional theory holds that people purchase insurance because they prefer the certainty of paying a small premium to the risk of getting sick and paying a large medical bill. This book presents a new theory of consumer demand for health insurance. It holds that people purchase insurance to obtain additional "income" when they become ill.
Book Synopsis The Theory of Demand for Health Insurance by : John A. Nyman
Download or read book The Theory of Demand for Health Insurance written by John A. Nyman and published by Stanford University Press. This book was released on 2003 with total page 228 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Why do people buy health insurance? Conventional theory holds that people purchase insurance because they prefer the certainty of paying a small premium to the risk of getting sick and paying a large medical bill. This book presents a new theory of consumer demand for health insurance. It holds that people purchase insurance to obtain additional "income" when they become ill.
Choosing economically optimal health insurance coverage involves a trade-off between risk reduction and the overuse of health care. The economic purpose of insurance is to reduce financial uncertainty or risk - the more health insurance lowers the risk, the greater will be the increase in social well-being. But increases in health insurance also increase the amount of medical care demand, because insurance lowers the out-of-pocket cost of health care - the larger the demand response of medical care to cost sharing, the greater the decrease in social well-being, due to the purchase of too much health care. This study examines this trade-off empirically by estimating both the demand for health insurance and the demand for health services. It relies on data from a randomized controlled trial of the cost sharing's effects on the use of health services and on the health status for a general, nonelderly (under age 65) population.
Book Synopsis Health Insurance: The Trade-Off Between Risk Pooling and Moral Hazard by :
Download or read book Health Insurance: The Trade-Off Between Risk Pooling and Moral Hazard written by and published by . This book was released on 1989 with total page 67 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Choosing economically optimal health insurance coverage involves a trade-off between risk reduction and the overuse of health care. The economic purpose of insurance is to reduce financial uncertainty or risk - the more health insurance lowers the risk, the greater will be the increase in social well-being. But increases in health insurance also increase the amount of medical care demand, because insurance lowers the out-of-pocket cost of health care - the larger the demand response of medical care to cost sharing, the greater the decrease in social well-being, due to the purchase of too much health care. This study examines this trade-off empirically by estimating both the demand for health insurance and the demand for health services. It relies on data from a randomized controlled trial of the cost sharing's effects on the use of health services and on the health status for a general, nonelderly (under age 65) population.
Over the past twenty years, many low- and middle-income countries have experimented with health insurance options. While their plans have varied widely in scale and ambition, their goals are the same: to make health services more affordable through the use of public subsidies while also moving care providers partially or fully into competitive markets. Until now, however, we have known little about the actual effects of these dramatic policy changes. Understanding the impact of health insurance-based care is key to the public policy debate of whether to extend insurance to low-income populationsand if so, how to do itor to serve them through other means.
Book Synopsis Impact of Health Insurance in Low- and Middle-income Countries by : Maria-Luisa Escobar
Download or read book Impact of Health Insurance in Low- and Middle-income Countries written by Maria-Luisa Escobar and published by Brookings Institution Press. This book was released on 2010 with total page 239 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Over the past twenty years, many low- and middle-income countries have experimented with health insurance options. While their plans have varied widely in scale and ambition, their goals are the same: to make health services more affordable through the use of public subsidies while also moving care providers partially or fully into competitive markets. Until now, however, we have known little about the actual effects of these dramatic policy changes. Understanding the impact of health insurance-based care is key to the public policy debate of whether to extend insurance to low-income populationsand if so, how to do itor to serve them through other means.
Seminar paper from the year 2015 in the subject Economy - Health Economics, grade: 1,0, University of Paderborn, language: English, abstract: The famous RAND Health Insurance Experiment (RAND HIE) deals with the question how health insurance affects medical spending. The scientific essay The RAND Health Insurance Experiment, Three Decades Later (2013) by Aviva Aron-Dine, Liran Einav, and Amy Finkelstein, extracted from the Journal of Economic Perspective, forms the basis for this seminar paper. All facts regarding the primary experiment are taken from this essay. It features a reexamination of the core findings of the RAND HIE with a state of the art perspective regarding the analysis of randomized experiments and the economics of moral hazard. Between 1974 and 1981, more than 5,800 individuals from about 2,000 households in six different locations across the United States participated in the RAND HIE and thereby received health insurance. The experiment randomly assigned families to health insurance plans with different levels of cost sharing and was representative of families with adults under the age of 62. The plans ranged from full coverage (“free care”) to plans with little coverage (5 percent) for the first approximately $4,000 (in 2011 dollars) incurred during a year. The conduct and analysis of randomized experiments as well as the economic analysis of moral hazard in the context of health insurance were relatively novel fields of research back in the years of the RAND investigation. Nevertheless, the RAND results are highly esteemed when predicting the likely impact of health insurance reforms on medical spending or design-ing actual insurance policies. In the course of time, health spending has grown and the consequent pressure on the public sector confers additional significance to the RAND estimates. The RAND HIE was funded by the US Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and cost roughly $295 million (in 2011 dollars). From a cost perspective alone, a replication of such an experiment is highly improbable. In section two, the design of the RAND HIE is presented and complemented by a depiction of the key economic object of interest, namely the impact of health insurance on medical spending. Section three describes the experimental analysis, including the baseline regression. The core variable of interest, the treatment effect, is specified and validated. In section four, the price elasticity is derived and the application discussed. Section five emphasizes the raison d’être for a randomized experiment based on statistical evidence and additional literature.
Book Synopsis A Review of the Rand Health Insurance Experiment. Statistics and Econometrics by : Nina Schwenniger
Download or read book A Review of the Rand Health Insurance Experiment. Statistics and Econometrics written by Nina Schwenniger and published by GRIN Verlag. This book was released on 2015-06-12 with total page 25 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Seminar paper from the year 2015 in the subject Economy - Health Economics, grade: 1,0, University of Paderborn, language: English, abstract: The famous RAND Health Insurance Experiment (RAND HIE) deals with the question how health insurance affects medical spending. The scientific essay The RAND Health Insurance Experiment, Three Decades Later (2013) by Aviva Aron-Dine, Liran Einav, and Amy Finkelstein, extracted from the Journal of Economic Perspective, forms the basis for this seminar paper. All facts regarding the primary experiment are taken from this essay. It features a reexamination of the core findings of the RAND HIE with a state of the art perspective regarding the analysis of randomized experiments and the economics of moral hazard. Between 1974 and 1981, more than 5,800 individuals from about 2,000 households in six different locations across the United States participated in the RAND HIE and thereby received health insurance. The experiment randomly assigned families to health insurance plans with different levels of cost sharing and was representative of families with adults under the age of 62. The plans ranged from full coverage (“free care”) to plans with little coverage (5 percent) for the first approximately $4,000 (in 2011 dollars) incurred during a year. The conduct and analysis of randomized experiments as well as the economic analysis of moral hazard in the context of health insurance were relatively novel fields of research back in the years of the RAND investigation. Nevertheless, the RAND results are highly esteemed when predicting the likely impact of health insurance reforms on medical spending or design-ing actual insurance policies. In the course of time, health spending has grown and the consequent pressure on the public sector confers additional significance to the RAND estimates. The RAND HIE was funded by the US Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and cost roughly $295 million (in 2011 dollars). From a cost perspective alone, a replication of such an experiment is highly improbable. In section two, the design of the RAND HIE is presented and complemented by a depiction of the key economic object of interest, namely the impact of health insurance on medical spending. Section three describes the experimental analysis, including the baseline regression. The core variable of interest, the treatment effect, is specified and validated. In section four, the price elasticity is derived and the application discussed. Section five emphasizes the raison d’être for a randomized experiment based on statistical evidence and additional literature.
Choosing optimal health insurance coverage involves a trade-off between the gain from risk reduction and the deadweight loss from moral hazard. This paper examines this trade-off empirically by estimating both the demand for health insurance and the demand for health services. It relies on data from a randomized controlled trial of cost-sharing's effects on the use of health services and on the health status for a general, non-elderly population.
Book Synopsis Health Insurance by : Willard G. Manning
Download or read book Health Insurance written by Willard G. Manning and published by . This book was released on 1997 with total page 639 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Choosing optimal health insurance coverage involves a trade-off between the gain from risk reduction and the deadweight loss from moral hazard. This paper examines this trade-off empirically by estimating both the demand for health insurance and the demand for health services. It relies on data from a randomized controlled trial of cost-sharing's effects on the use of health services and on the health status for a general, non-elderly population.
This paper examines the determinants of hospital stay intensity, the decision to seek hospital care as a public or private patient and the decision to purchase private hospital insurance. We describe a theoretical model to motivate the simultaneous nature of these decisions. For the empirical analysis, we develop a simultaneous equation econometric model that accommodates the count data nature of length of stay and the binary nature of the patient type and insurance decisions. The model also accounts for the endogeneity of the patient type and insurance binary variables. The results indicate that there is no evidence of endogeneity between the decision to purchase insurance on the type and intensity of hospital care use. We find some evidence of moral hazard effects of private hospital insurance on the intensity of private hospital care. The results also indicate that the length of hospital stay for private patients is shorter than for public patients.
Book Synopsis Demand for Hospital Care and Private Health Insurance in a Mixed Public-private System by : Terence Chai Cheng
Download or read book Demand for Hospital Care and Private Health Insurance in a Mixed Public-private System written by Terence Chai Cheng and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 34 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper examines the determinants of hospital stay intensity, the decision to seek hospital care as a public or private patient and the decision to purchase private hospital insurance. We describe a theoretical model to motivate the simultaneous nature of these decisions. For the empirical analysis, we develop a simultaneous equation econometric model that accommodates the count data nature of length of stay and the binary nature of the patient type and insurance decisions. The model also accounts for the endogeneity of the patient type and insurance binary variables. The results indicate that there is no evidence of endogeneity between the decision to purchase insurance on the type and intensity of hospital care use. We find some evidence of moral hazard effects of private hospital insurance on the intensity of private hospital care. The results also indicate that the length of hospital stay for private patients is shorter than for public patients.
Uncertainty about risks to health virtually requires that people have health insurance. But how is the cost of premiums determined? Should rates vary according to some indicators of risk? How much do premiums vary with risk? Do the young and the healthy actually subsidize the old and the unhealthy?
Book Synopsis Pooling Health Insurance Risks by : Mark V. Pauly
Download or read book Pooling Health Insurance Risks written by Mark V. Pauly and published by American Enterprise Institute. This book was released on 1999 with total page 120 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Uncertainty about risks to health virtually requires that people have health insurance. But how is the cost of premiums determined? Should rates vary according to some indicators of risk? How much do premiums vary with risk? Do the young and the healthy actually subsidize the old and the unhealthy?
