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The ways in which human action and rationality are guided by norms are well documented in philosophy and neighboring disciplines. But how do norms shape the way we experience the world perceptually? The present volume explores this question and investigates the specific normativity inherent to perception.
Book Synopsis Normativity in Perception by : Maxime Doyon
Download or read book Normativity in Perception written by Maxime Doyon and published by Springer. This book was released on 2015-08-25 with total page 366 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The ways in which human action and rationality are guided by norms are well documented in philosophy and neighboring disciplines. But how do norms shape the way we experience the world perceptually? The present volume explores this question and investigates the specific normativity inherent to perception.
The ways in which human action and rationality are guided by norms are well documented in philosophy and neighboring disciplines. But how do norms shape the way we experience the world perceptually? The present volume explores this question and investigates the specific normativity inherent to perception.
Book Synopsis Normativity in Perception by : Maxime Doyon
Download or read book Normativity in Perception written by Maxime Doyon and published by Springer. This book was released on 2015-08-25 with total page 231 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The ways in which human action and rationality are guided by norms are well documented in philosophy and neighboring disciplines. But how do norms shape the way we experience the world perceptually? The present volume explores this question and investigates the specific normativity inherent to perception.
Demonstrates how phenomenology constructively addresses problems in philosophy of mind, moral psychology and philosophy of action.
Book Synopsis Normativity and Phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger by : Steven Crowell
Download or read book Normativity and Phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger written by Steven Crowell and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2013-04-25 with total page 339 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Demonstrates how phenomenology constructively addresses problems in philosophy of mind, moral psychology and philosophy of action.
This volume investigates forms of normativity through the phenomenological methods of description, analysis, and interpretation. It takes a broad approach to norms, covering not only rules and commands but also goals, values, and passive drives and tendencies. Part I "Basic Perspectives" begins with an overview of the phenomena of normativity and then clarifies the constitution of norms by Husserlian and Heideggerian concepts. It offers phenomenological alternatives to the neo-Kantian and neo-Hegelian approaches that dominate contemporary debates on the "sources of normativity." Part II "From Perception to Imagination" turns to the normativity of three basic types of experiences. This part first sheds light on the normativity of perception and then illuminates the kind of normativity characteristic of imagination and drive intentionality. Part III "Social Dimensions" analyzes the norms that regulate the formation of practical communities. It takes a broad view of practical norms, discussing social and moral norms as well as the epistemic norms of scientific practices. By clarifying the divergences and interrelations between various types and levels of norms, the volume demonstrates that normativity is not one phenomenon but a complex set of various phenomena with multiple sources. Contemporary Phenomenologies of Normativity: Norms, Goals, and Values will be of interest to researchers and advanced students working on issues of normativity in phenomenology, epistemology, ethics, and social philosophy.
Book Synopsis Contemporary Phenomenologies of Normativity by : Sara Heinämaa
Download or read book Contemporary Phenomenologies of Normativity written by Sara Heinämaa and published by Routledge. This book was released on 2022-03-30 with total page 295 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This volume investigates forms of normativity through the phenomenological methods of description, analysis, and interpretation. It takes a broad approach to norms, covering not only rules and commands but also goals, values, and passive drives and tendencies. Part I "Basic Perspectives" begins with an overview of the phenomena of normativity and then clarifies the constitution of norms by Husserlian and Heideggerian concepts. It offers phenomenological alternatives to the neo-Kantian and neo-Hegelian approaches that dominate contemporary debates on the "sources of normativity." Part II "From Perception to Imagination" turns to the normativity of three basic types of experiences. This part first sheds light on the normativity of perception and then illuminates the kind of normativity characteristic of imagination and drive intentionality. Part III "Social Dimensions" analyzes the norms that regulate the formation of practical communities. It takes a broad view of practical norms, discussing social and moral norms as well as the epistemic norms of scientific practices. By clarifying the divergences and interrelations between various types and levels of norms, the volume demonstrates that normativity is not one phenomenon but a complex set of various phenomena with multiple sources. Contemporary Phenomenologies of Normativity: Norms, Goals, and Values will be of interest to researchers and advanced students working on issues of normativity in phenomenology, epistemology, ethics, and social philosophy.
Imagine holding a cone of mint chocolate chip ice cream on a hot day. As you eye the ice cream, you see that it's melting. If you don't act quickly, you'll wind up with sticky hands. Now pause this scene and ask yourself, 'What should I do?' The answer seems obvious: you should lick the melting ice cream. To say why this answer seems so reasonable, we need to say something about the normativity of perception. Perception, after all, is what tells you that the ice cream is melting. But we might also say something about the perception of normativity. Perception might also tell you that the ice cream calls for a lick. According to this latter story, perception doesn't just tell you what to believe, it tells you what to do. I defend a version of this story in my dissertation. Ultimately I argue that charged experience is a source of immediate justification for normative beliefs. Such experiences are characterized by a feeling of being called to respond. The melting ice cream, for example, calls for a lick. Drawing upon phenomenological analyses of such cases, I argue that felt calls are reflected in the contents of charged experiences. Charged experiences have normative contents; they present certain considerations as reasons to respond in specific ways. According to this story, the belief that you should lick the melting ice cream is reasonable because charged experience tells you that you have reason to do so. Charged experience is thus a form of normative perception
Book Synopsis The Normativity of Perception and the Perception of Normativity by : Matthias Thomas Socatean Barker
Download or read book The Normativity of Perception and the Perception of Normativity written by Matthias Thomas Socatean Barker and published by . This book was released on 2020 with total page 268 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Imagine holding a cone of mint chocolate chip ice cream on a hot day. As you eye the ice cream, you see that it's melting. If you don't act quickly, you'll wind up with sticky hands. Now pause this scene and ask yourself, 'What should I do?' The answer seems obvious: you should lick the melting ice cream. To say why this answer seems so reasonable, we need to say something about the normativity of perception. Perception, after all, is what tells you that the ice cream is melting. But we might also say something about the perception of normativity. Perception might also tell you that the ice cream calls for a lick. According to this latter story, perception doesn't just tell you what to believe, it tells you what to do. I defend a version of this story in my dissertation. Ultimately I argue that charged experience is a source of immediate justification for normative beliefs. Such experiences are characterized by a feeling of being called to respond. The melting ice cream, for example, calls for a lick. Drawing upon phenomenological analyses of such cases, I argue that felt calls are reflected in the contents of charged experiences. Charged experiences have normative contents; they present certain considerations as reasons to respond in specific ways. According to this story, the belief that you should lick the melting ice cream is reasonable because charged experience tells you that you have reason to do so. Charged experience is thus a form of normative perception
Alan Millar examines our understanding of why people think and act as they do. His key theme is that normative considerations form an indispensable part of the explanatory framework in terms of which we seek to understand each other. Millar defends a conception according to which normativity is linked to reasons. On this basis he examines the structure of certain normative commitments incurred by having propositional attitudes. Controversially, he argues that ascriptions of beliefs and intentions in and of themselves attribute normative commitments and that this has implications for the psychology of believing and intending. Indeed, all propositional attitudes of the sort we ascribe to people have a normative dimension, since possessing the concepts that the attitudes implicate is of its very nature commitment-incurring. The ramifications of these views for our understanding of people is explored. Millar offers illuminating discussions of reasons for belief and reasons for action; the explanation of beliefs and actions in terms of the subject's reasons; the idea that simulation has a key role in understanding people; and the limits of explanation in terms of propositional attitudes. He compares and contrasts the commitments incurred by propositional attitudes with those incurred by participating in practices, arguing that the former should not be assimilated to the latter. Understanding People will be of great interest to most philosophers of mind, as well as to those working on practical and theoretical reasoning.
Book Synopsis Understanding People by : Alan Millar
Download or read book Understanding People written by Alan Millar and published by Clarendon Press. This book was released on 2004-07-08 with total page 280 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Alan Millar examines our understanding of why people think and act as they do. His key theme is that normative considerations form an indispensable part of the explanatory framework in terms of which we seek to understand each other. Millar defends a conception according to which normativity is linked to reasons. On this basis he examines the structure of certain normative commitments incurred by having propositional attitudes. Controversially, he argues that ascriptions of beliefs and intentions in and of themselves attribute normative commitments and that this has implications for the psychology of believing and intending. Indeed, all propositional attitudes of the sort we ascribe to people have a normative dimension, since possessing the concepts that the attitudes implicate is of its very nature commitment-incurring. The ramifications of these views for our understanding of people is explored. Millar offers illuminating discussions of reasons for belief and reasons for action; the explanation of beliefs and actions in terms of the subject's reasons; the idea that simulation has a key role in understanding people; and the limits of explanation in terms of propositional attitudes. He compares and contrasts the commitments incurred by propositional attitudes with those incurred by participating in practices, arguing that the former should not be assimilated to the latter. Understanding People will be of great interest to most philosophers of mind, as well as to those working on practical and theoretical reasoning.
A milestone in Kant scholarship, this interpretation of his critical philosophy makes sense of his notorious 'synthetic judgments a priori'.
Book Synopsis Kant's Theory of Normativity by : Konstantin Pollok
Download or read book Kant's Theory of Normativity written by Konstantin Pollok and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2017-02-02 with total page 343 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A milestone in Kant scholarship, this interpretation of his critical philosophy makes sense of his notorious 'synthetic judgments a priori'.
In philosophy, perception is usually evaluated considering epistemological concerns about truth and falsity. Doyon suggests instead that it is governed by different, immanent "perceptual norms" that are not disconnected from reality; rather they tell us how our experience of reality is shaped. This book explores these ideas and their implications.
Book Synopsis Phenomenology and the Norms of Perception by : MAXIME. DOYON
Download or read book Phenomenology and the Norms of Perception written by MAXIME. DOYON and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2024-09-14 with total page 287 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In philosophy, perception is usually evaluated considering epistemological concerns about truth and falsity. Doyon suggests instead that it is governed by different, immanent "perceptual norms" that are not disconnected from reality; rather they tell us how our experience of reality is shaped. This book explores these ideas and their implications.
In virtue of what is perception successful? In philosophy and psychology, we sometimes assume that visual accuracy amounts to a correspondence between percepts and subject-independent, physical properties. In this dissertation, I argue that we should reject this assumption in favor of norms grounded in the action-guiding nature of perception. Recent theories of perception purport to cast off the intellectualist baggage of twentieth-century thinking, and to address perception in its own distinctive terms. I show that these approaches are unified in aiming to reduce spatial aspects of the percept to subject-independent geometrical facts about the object-perceiver relation. In doing so, these views remain guilty of an unwarranted assimilation of perception to cognition. Perceptual constancy, the capacity to encounter a relatively stable world of object properties despite variation in sensory stimulation, is measured using a metric that has percept-physical property correspondence at one extreme, and retinal match at the other. Advocates of the correspondence norm freely redeploy this metric as gauging accuracy in perception, so that the closer a percept comes to invariantly matching the distal property, the closer it comes to veridically presenting the environment. Yet, correspondence views are committed to widespread misperception that cannot be accounted for in terms of evolutionary complexity. I distinguish between descriptive and normative enterprises in cognitive science, and suggest that we reinterpret the constancy metric as an empirically useful, descriptive quantificational tool--one that does not straightforwardly entail normative facts. With the correspondence norm undercut, I develop a more viable framework for understanding accuracy, one that draws on James Gibson's ecological theory. Accordingly, accuracy is best understood pragmatically, in ecological terms such as usefulness. Partial constancy is often sufficient for an organism to act effectively in its environment, a result that suggests surprising consequences for what is seen in perception. In color ontology, there is some theoretical attention to descriptive facts about constancy. However, because of a worry about stipulating perceiver and context standards, theorists continue to reject ecological approaches to color. I resolve the worry by appealing to pluralism about scientific objects. The resulting framework is ecologically sensible, empirically useful, and deeply interdisciplinary.
Book Synopsis Seeing Things as We Do by : Louise Ellen Daoust
Download or read book Seeing Things as We Do written by Louise Ellen Daoust and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 422 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In virtue of what is perception successful? In philosophy and psychology, we sometimes assume that visual accuracy amounts to a correspondence between percepts and subject-independent, physical properties. In this dissertation, I argue that we should reject this assumption in favor of norms grounded in the action-guiding nature of perception. Recent theories of perception purport to cast off the intellectualist baggage of twentieth-century thinking, and to address perception in its own distinctive terms. I show that these approaches are unified in aiming to reduce spatial aspects of the percept to subject-independent geometrical facts about the object-perceiver relation. In doing so, these views remain guilty of an unwarranted assimilation of perception to cognition. Perceptual constancy, the capacity to encounter a relatively stable world of object properties despite variation in sensory stimulation, is measured using a metric that has percept-physical property correspondence at one extreme, and retinal match at the other. Advocates of the correspondence norm freely redeploy this metric as gauging accuracy in perception, so that the closer a percept comes to invariantly matching the distal property, the closer it comes to veridically presenting the environment. Yet, correspondence views are committed to widespread misperception that cannot be accounted for in terms of evolutionary complexity. I distinguish between descriptive and normative enterprises in cognitive science, and suggest that we reinterpret the constancy metric as an empirically useful, descriptive quantificational tool--one that does not straightforwardly entail normative facts. With the correspondence norm undercut, I develop a more viable framework for understanding accuracy, one that draws on James Gibson's ecological theory. Accordingly, accuracy is best understood pragmatically, in ecological terms such as usefulness. Partial constancy is often sufficient for an organism to act effectively in its environment, a result that suggests surprising consequences for what is seen in perception. In color ontology, there is some theoretical attention to descriptive facts about constancy. However, because of a worry about stipulating perceiver and context standards, theorists continue to reject ecological approaches to color. I resolve the worry by appealing to pluralism about scientific objects. The resulting framework is ecologically sensible, empirically useful, and deeply interdisciplinary.
This volume provides a framework for approaching and understanding mental normativity. It presents cutting-edge research on the ethics of belief as well as innovative research beyond the normativity of belief—and towards an ethics of mind. By moving beyond traditional issues of epistemology the contributors discuss the most current ideas revolving around rationality, responsibility, and normativity. The book’s chapters are divided into two main parts. Part I discusses contemporary issues surrounding the normativity of belief. The essays here cover topics such as control over belief and its implication for the ethics of belief, the role of the epistemic community for the possibility of epistemic normativity, responsibility for believing, doxastic partiality in friendship, the structure and content of epistemic norms, and the norms for suspension of judgment. In Part II the focus shifts from the practical dimensions of belief to the normativity and rationality of other mental states—especially blame, passing thoughts, fantasies, decisions, and emotions. These essays illustrate how we might approach an ethics of mind by focusing not only on belief, but also more generally on debates about responsibility and rationality, as well as on normative questions concerning other mental states or attitudes. The Ethics of Belief and Beyond paves the way towards an ethics of mind by building on and contributing to recent philosophical discussions in the ethics of belief and the normativity of other mental phenomena. It will be of interest to upper-level students and researchers working in epistemology, ethics, philosophy of action, philosophy of mind, and moral psychology.
Book Synopsis The Ethics of Belief and Beyond by : Sebastian Schmidt
Download or read book The Ethics of Belief and Beyond written by Sebastian Schmidt and published by Routledge. This book was released on 2020-04-03 with total page 270 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This volume provides a framework for approaching and understanding mental normativity. It presents cutting-edge research on the ethics of belief as well as innovative research beyond the normativity of belief—and towards an ethics of mind. By moving beyond traditional issues of epistemology the contributors discuss the most current ideas revolving around rationality, responsibility, and normativity. The book’s chapters are divided into two main parts. Part I discusses contemporary issues surrounding the normativity of belief. The essays here cover topics such as control over belief and its implication for the ethics of belief, the role of the epistemic community for the possibility of epistemic normativity, responsibility for believing, doxastic partiality in friendship, the structure and content of epistemic norms, and the norms for suspension of judgment. In Part II the focus shifts from the practical dimensions of belief to the normativity and rationality of other mental states—especially blame, passing thoughts, fantasies, decisions, and emotions. These essays illustrate how we might approach an ethics of mind by focusing not only on belief, but also more generally on debates about responsibility and rationality, as well as on normative questions concerning other mental states or attitudes. The Ethics of Belief and Beyond paves the way towards an ethics of mind by building on and contributing to recent philosophical discussions in the ethics of belief and the normativity of other mental phenomena. It will be of interest to upper-level students and researchers working in epistemology, ethics, philosophy of action, philosophy of mind, and moral psychology.
