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Operation Anaconda, conducted in the Shahikot Valley of Afghanistan during early March 2002, was a complex battle fought in rugged mountainous terrain under difficult conditions. The battle ended as an American victory at the cost of eight U.S. military personnel killed and more than 50 wounded. But the difficult early stages of the battle provide insights for thinking about how to organize, train, and equip U.S. forces for future joint expeditionary operations and how to pursue transformation.
Book Synopsis Operation Anaconda: Lessons for Joint Operations by : Richard Kugler
Download or read book Operation Anaconda: Lessons for Joint Operations written by Richard Kugler and published by CreateSpace. This book was released on 2012-07-06 with total page 74 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Operation Anaconda, conducted in the Shahikot Valley of Afghanistan during early March 2002, was a complex battle fought in rugged mountainous terrain under difficult conditions. The battle ended as an American victory at the cost of eight U.S. military personnel killed and more than 50 wounded. But the difficult early stages of the battle provide insights for thinking about how to organize, train, and equip U.S. forces for future joint expeditionary operations and how to pursue transformation.
Drawing upon interviews with commanders and non-commissioned officers, this study offers lessons and observations that can be learned from the battle and applied to future joint endeavors, multinational operations, and joint expeditionary warfare.
Book Synopsis Operation Anaconda by : Richard L. Kugler
Download or read book Operation Anaconda written by Richard L. Kugler and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 59 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Drawing upon interviews with commanders and non-commissioned officers, this study offers lessons and observations that can be learned from the battle and applied to future joint endeavors, multinational operations, and joint expeditionary warfare.
Operation Anaconda, conducted in the Shahikot Valley of Afghanistan during early March 2002, was a complex battle fought in rugged mountainous terrain under difficult conditions. The battle ended as an American victory at the cost of eight U.S. military personnel killed and more than 50 wounded. But the difficult early stages of the battle provide insights for thinking about how to organize, train, and equip U.S. forces for future joint expeditionary operations and how to pursue transformation. Intricate and exact details of the battle are hard to determine, as often is the case when participants have differing memories and insights. Post-facto observers derive differing interpretations from the same information, while newspaper accounts sometimes report wrong information about the particulars. Because "truth" is a function of one's angle of vision, this battle will be debated for a long time, and interpretations of its lessons will remain controversial.Anaconda did not conform to theories of information-age battles. It was conducted at a time when U.S. military operations in Afghanistan were undergoing a transition. Earlier, the U.S. ground presence had been limited largely to special operations forces, which worked with friendly Afghan units and helped spot ground targets for U.S. air strikes. By contrast, Operation Anaconda marked the initial use of U.S. Army battalions performing ground maneuvers against enemy forces that required significant air strikes in supporting ways. At the time, the U.S. joint military presence and infrastructure in Afghanistan were not fully mature for these new operations. This situation, coupled with the congested and difficult terrain of the Shahikot Valley, played a major contributing role in the problems experienced during Anaconda's initial days.Executive Summary * The Lessons of Operation Anaconda for Joint Operations * Setting the Stage: Why Anaconda Encountered Problems in the First Few Days * Lesson 1: Unity of Command and Joint Planning * Lesson 2: Intelligence Estimates and Battle Plans * Lesson 3: Integrating Air-Ground Operations * Lesson 4: Mission Orders and Rules of Engagement * Lesson 5: Training for Surprises * Lesson 6: Joint Operations at All Levels
Book Synopsis Operation Anaconda by : U. S. Military
Download or read book Operation Anaconda written by U. S. Military and published by Independently Published. This book was released on 2018-11-17 with total page 98 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Operation Anaconda, conducted in the Shahikot Valley of Afghanistan during early March 2002, was a complex battle fought in rugged mountainous terrain under difficult conditions. The battle ended as an American victory at the cost of eight U.S. military personnel killed and more than 50 wounded. But the difficult early stages of the battle provide insights for thinking about how to organize, train, and equip U.S. forces for future joint expeditionary operations and how to pursue transformation. Intricate and exact details of the battle are hard to determine, as often is the case when participants have differing memories and insights. Post-facto observers derive differing interpretations from the same information, while newspaper accounts sometimes report wrong information about the particulars. Because "truth" is a function of one's angle of vision, this battle will be debated for a long time, and interpretations of its lessons will remain controversial.Anaconda did not conform to theories of information-age battles. It was conducted at a time when U.S. military operations in Afghanistan were undergoing a transition. Earlier, the U.S. ground presence had been limited largely to special operations forces, which worked with friendly Afghan units and helped spot ground targets for U.S. air strikes. By contrast, Operation Anaconda marked the initial use of U.S. Army battalions performing ground maneuvers against enemy forces that required significant air strikes in supporting ways. At the time, the U.S. joint military presence and infrastructure in Afghanistan were not fully mature for these new operations. This situation, coupled with the congested and difficult terrain of the Shahikot Valley, played a major contributing role in the problems experienced during Anaconda's initial days.Executive Summary * The Lessons of Operation Anaconda for Joint Operations * Setting the Stage: Why Anaconda Encountered Problems in the First Few Days * Lesson 1: Unity of Command and Joint Planning * Lesson 2: Intelligence Estimates and Battle Plans * Lesson 3: Integrating Air-Ground Operations * Lesson 4: Mission Orders and Rules of Engagement * Lesson 5: Training for Surprises * Lesson 6: Joint Operations at All Levels
Operation Anaconda, a subordinate operation to Operation Enduring Freedom in 2002, was notable for difficulties in integrating US air and ground forces in order to bring combat power to bear on a stronger than originally anticipated foe. In the seven years of study and debate since 2002, key players from both sides have for the most part agreed that with better preliminary coordination, the operation could have been executed less risk to US and coalition personnel. While many commentators have noted that suboptimal command and control relationships, lack of communication, and confusion all contributed to the initial problems in air/ground coordination, few have examined the joint and service doctrine from 2002 to determine to what degree it might have negatively influenced the smooth planning and execution of the operation. This study seeks to determine if any inconsistencies or omissions in joint and service doctrine may have contributed to the problems with air and ground integration observed in Operation Anaconda, and also to determine if doctrinal updates since 2002 have adequately addressed any systemic disconnects the study discovers. In any cases where modern doctrine still does not address the key problems noted in Anaconda, the study will suggest modifications to doctrine which will increase the likelihood that the key "lessons observed" from the operation truly become "lessons learned" in the institutional consciousnesses of the ground and air components.Determining the best way to integrate the capabilities of the different US military services-increasing "jointness"-has been a continuous challenge in modern warfare. Despite the vast increases in communications and information sharing capabilities that have accompanied digitalization, integrating the efforts of the various services continues to present a challenge. These problems of integration have been especially acute between the United States' oldest and youngest military services-namely, the US Army and US Air Force. Over their sixty plus year relationship, in both peacetime and war, the two services have often argued and debated over what the proper relationships should be between the ground and air components, and how they should be defined. Both have codified these beliefs in their individual service doctrines, which respond to joint doctrine from their own service's perspective, and also provide the intellectual underpinnings of their permanent and abiding partnership between the ground and air focused services. But outside of actual combat, there are seldom sufficiently robust opportunities to see if the various doctrines are compatible in the actual practice of high intensity combat. This paper will examine a case study from recent combat history in which the ties between the Army and Air Force were indeed tested, and were by many accounts found wanting.From a results based viewpoint, March 2002's Operation Anaconda was a tactical success against Al Qaeda and its Taliban supporters in Afghanistan, with the key events of the operation summarized as follows: Originally planned as a three-day battle with light combat, Operation Anaconda turned out to be a seven-day battle with intense combat and was officially terminated only after 17 days. Operation Anaconda, which lasted from March 218, was successful because up to several hundred enemy fighters were killed and the rest fled the Shahikot Valley, leaving it in the control of US and allied forces. US casualties totaled eight military personnel killed and over 50 wounded. Success was achieved because the US military showed a capacity to adapt by employing joint operations and modern information networks to surmount a surprising and difficult challenge.
Book Synopsis Operation Anaconda by : U. S. Military
Download or read book Operation Anaconda written by U. S. Military and published by . This book was released on 2018-11-18 with total page 86 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Operation Anaconda, a subordinate operation to Operation Enduring Freedom in 2002, was notable for difficulties in integrating US air and ground forces in order to bring combat power to bear on a stronger than originally anticipated foe. In the seven years of study and debate since 2002, key players from both sides have for the most part agreed that with better preliminary coordination, the operation could have been executed less risk to US and coalition personnel. While many commentators have noted that suboptimal command and control relationships, lack of communication, and confusion all contributed to the initial problems in air/ground coordination, few have examined the joint and service doctrine from 2002 to determine to what degree it might have negatively influenced the smooth planning and execution of the operation. This study seeks to determine if any inconsistencies or omissions in joint and service doctrine may have contributed to the problems with air and ground integration observed in Operation Anaconda, and also to determine if doctrinal updates since 2002 have adequately addressed any systemic disconnects the study discovers. In any cases where modern doctrine still does not address the key problems noted in Anaconda, the study will suggest modifications to doctrine which will increase the likelihood that the key "lessons observed" from the operation truly become "lessons learned" in the institutional consciousnesses of the ground and air components.Determining the best way to integrate the capabilities of the different US military services-increasing "jointness"-has been a continuous challenge in modern warfare. Despite the vast increases in communications and information sharing capabilities that have accompanied digitalization, integrating the efforts of the various services continues to present a challenge. These problems of integration have been especially acute between the United States' oldest and youngest military services-namely, the US Army and US Air Force. Over their sixty plus year relationship, in both peacetime and war, the two services have often argued and debated over what the proper relationships should be between the ground and air components, and how they should be defined. Both have codified these beliefs in their individual service doctrines, which respond to joint doctrine from their own service's perspective, and also provide the intellectual underpinnings of their permanent and abiding partnership between the ground and air focused services. But outside of actual combat, there are seldom sufficiently robust opportunities to see if the various doctrines are compatible in the actual practice of high intensity combat. This paper will examine a case study from recent combat history in which the ties between the Army and Air Force were indeed tested, and were by many accounts found wanting.From a results based viewpoint, March 2002's Operation Anaconda was a tactical success against Al Qaeda and its Taliban supporters in Afghanistan, with the key events of the operation summarized as follows: Originally planned as a three-day battle with light combat, Operation Anaconda turned out to be a seven-day battle with intense combat and was officially terminated only after 17 days. Operation Anaconda, which lasted from March 218, was successful because up to several hundred enemy fighters were killed and the rest fled the Shahikot Valley, leaving it in the control of US and allied forces. US casualties totaled eight military personnel killed and over 50 wounded. Success was achieved because the US military showed a capacity to adapt by employing joint operations and modern information networks to surmount a surprising and difficult challenge.
Four important reports about Operation Anaconda during the Afghanistan War are reproduced: Criticisms Associated With Operation Anaconda - Can Long Distance Leadership Be Effective? * Operation Anaconda: Lessons for Joint Operations * Operation Anaconda: Lessons Learned, or Lessons Observed? * An Air Power PerspectiveOne of the most crucial joint combat operations in Afghanistan was Operation ANACONDA, designed and executed to remove the last remaining organized Taliban resistance. Operation ANACONDA generated lessons involving many aspects of the art of joint warfare.From 2-16 March 2002, a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF), built around 1,411 U.S. Army soldiers, and Special Operations Forces (SOF) from the United States and six other nations took on the task of clearing the Shahi Kot valley in eastern Afghanistan of al-Qaeda and Taliban forces who had survived earlier battles. It was a complex, non-linear battle that demanded full integration of Joint forces-and, to the frustration of all, revealed some Joint warfighting stress points.For the first time in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, American forces were locked in a prolonged ground battle in difficult terrain. Eight Americans (5 U.S. Army, 2 USAF and 1 U.S. Navy SEAL) died during Operation ANACONDA and 80 were wounded. Seven of those deaths came on 4 March 2002 at the ridgeline at Takur Gar during a helicopter insertion of a Special Forces team and an attempt to rescue them.Operation ANACONDA also turned out to be an acid test of land and air component cooperation in a pitched fight. The al-Qaeda and Taliban forces holed up in prepared defensive positions in the 10,000-foot mountains and rained mortars and small arms fire down on the Soldiers, Sailors, and Airmen holding blocking positions below. Over the next two weeks, bombers, fighters, helicopters and AC-130 gunships delivered close air support (CAS) into the postage-stamp size battle area measuring about 8 nautical miles (nm) x 8 nm. Deconfliction and coordination of this "fire support" proved challenging with friendly troops and controllers in a small area. In the air, funneling the strikes in was just as intense, and strike aircraft reported several near misses as one pulled up from an attack run while another rolled onto the target. After initial contact sparked heavy fighting, air controllers attached to ground forces or airborne in OA-10 Thunderbolts called in airpower to provide immediate close air support.Ultimately, Operation ANACONDA was a success. "Operation ANACONDA sought to clear the enemy in that valley area and in those hills," said General Tommy R. Franks, U.S. Army, Commander, U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), "and succeeded in doing so where many operations in history had not been able to get that done." However, it was also an object lesson in the complexities of planning and executing rapid air support for ground operations in a hostile, rugged environment. The report that follows seeks to document air and ground operations during the battle in a case-study format. It offers new statistical analysis from a joint database of the immediate close air support delivered during the battle.
Book Synopsis Complete Guide to Operation Anaconda in the Afghanistan War by : U. S. Military
Download or read book Complete Guide to Operation Anaconda in the Afghanistan War written by U. S. Military and published by . This book was released on 2018-11-19 with total page 216 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Four important reports about Operation Anaconda during the Afghanistan War are reproduced: Criticisms Associated With Operation Anaconda - Can Long Distance Leadership Be Effective? * Operation Anaconda: Lessons for Joint Operations * Operation Anaconda: Lessons Learned, or Lessons Observed? * An Air Power PerspectiveOne of the most crucial joint combat operations in Afghanistan was Operation ANACONDA, designed and executed to remove the last remaining organized Taliban resistance. Operation ANACONDA generated lessons involving many aspects of the art of joint warfare.From 2-16 March 2002, a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF), built around 1,411 U.S. Army soldiers, and Special Operations Forces (SOF) from the United States and six other nations took on the task of clearing the Shahi Kot valley in eastern Afghanistan of al-Qaeda and Taliban forces who had survived earlier battles. It was a complex, non-linear battle that demanded full integration of Joint forces-and, to the frustration of all, revealed some Joint warfighting stress points.For the first time in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, American forces were locked in a prolonged ground battle in difficult terrain. Eight Americans (5 U.S. Army, 2 USAF and 1 U.S. Navy SEAL) died during Operation ANACONDA and 80 were wounded. Seven of those deaths came on 4 March 2002 at the ridgeline at Takur Gar during a helicopter insertion of a Special Forces team and an attempt to rescue them.Operation ANACONDA also turned out to be an acid test of land and air component cooperation in a pitched fight. The al-Qaeda and Taliban forces holed up in prepared defensive positions in the 10,000-foot mountains and rained mortars and small arms fire down on the Soldiers, Sailors, and Airmen holding blocking positions below. Over the next two weeks, bombers, fighters, helicopters and AC-130 gunships delivered close air support (CAS) into the postage-stamp size battle area measuring about 8 nautical miles (nm) x 8 nm. Deconfliction and coordination of this "fire support" proved challenging with friendly troops and controllers in a small area. In the air, funneling the strikes in was just as intense, and strike aircraft reported several near misses as one pulled up from an attack run while another rolled onto the target. After initial contact sparked heavy fighting, air controllers attached to ground forces or airborne in OA-10 Thunderbolts called in airpower to provide immediate close air support.Ultimately, Operation ANACONDA was a success. "Operation ANACONDA sought to clear the enemy in that valley area and in those hills," said General Tommy R. Franks, U.S. Army, Commander, U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), "and succeeded in doing so where many operations in history had not been able to get that done." However, it was also an object lesson in the complexities of planning and executing rapid air support for ground operations in a hostile, rugged environment. The report that follows seeks to document air and ground operations during the battle in a case-study format. It offers new statistical analysis from a joint database of the immediate close air support delivered during the battle.
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States and a coalition of like-minded nations embarked on a worldwide campaign against terrorism. In support of this fight, the United States Air Force has played a vital role in Operations NOBLE EAGLE, ENDURING FREEDOM, and most recently, IRAQI FREEDOM. In memory of the victims of terrorism and in consideration of the Airmen who will see this fight through to victory, we must learn and apply the lessons of air and space operations in these joint campaigns. Few causes will ever have greater importance. One of the most crucial joint combat operations in Afghanistan was Operation ANACONDA, designed and executed to remove the last remaining organized Taliban resistance. Operation ANACONDA generated lessons involving many aspects of the art of joint warfare. These are explored in detail in this report, Operation ANACONDA, An Airpower Perspective. This report reminds all Airmen of the complexities inherent in a successful joint operation. It highlights the necessity of clear lines of command, and it reminds us that organizational capabilities and proper coordination of joint activities cannot be taken for granted. It is also vital to realize that lessons learned from this operation were used to improve our joint combat planning and capabilities in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. As a Service, we will continue to refine the employment of our expeditionary air and space forces in joint operations to ensure their effectiveness over any adversary. We will all benefit from embracing and applying the thorough and thoughtful reporting and analysis in these and other lessons learned reports. We cannot afford to do less.Executive Summary * Chapter 1: Introduction * Chapter 2: Planning for Operations in the Khowst-Gardez Region * Chapter 3: Widening the Plan * Chapter 4: The First 72 Hours: 2-4 March 2002 * Chapter 5: Renewing the Attack: 5-15 March 2002 * Chapter 6: Persistent Close Air Support * Chapter 7: ObservationsOperation ANACONDA is a unique case study in the application of force. From 2-16 March 2002, a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF), built around 1,411 U.S. Army soldiers, and Special Operations Forces (SOF) from the United States and six other nations took on the task of clearing the Shahi Kot valley in eastern Afghanistan of al-Qaeda and Taliban forces who had survived earlier battles. It was a complex, non-linear battle that demanded full integration of Joint forces-and, to the frustration of all, revealed some Joint warfighting stress points. For the first time in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, American forces were locked in a prolonged ground battle in difficult terrain. Eight Americans (5 U.S. Army, 2 USAF and 1 U.S. Navy SEAL) died during Operation ANACONDA and 80 were wounded. Seven of those deaths came on 4 March 2002 at the ridgeline at Takur Gar during a helicopter insertion of a Special Forces team and an attempt to rescue them.
Book Synopsis Operation Anaconda by : U. S. Military
Download or read book Operation Anaconda written by U. S. Military and published by . This book was released on 2018-11-18 with total page 116 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States and a coalition of like-minded nations embarked on a worldwide campaign against terrorism. In support of this fight, the United States Air Force has played a vital role in Operations NOBLE EAGLE, ENDURING FREEDOM, and most recently, IRAQI FREEDOM. In memory of the victims of terrorism and in consideration of the Airmen who will see this fight through to victory, we must learn and apply the lessons of air and space operations in these joint campaigns. Few causes will ever have greater importance. One of the most crucial joint combat operations in Afghanistan was Operation ANACONDA, designed and executed to remove the last remaining organized Taliban resistance. Operation ANACONDA generated lessons involving many aspects of the art of joint warfare. These are explored in detail in this report, Operation ANACONDA, An Airpower Perspective. This report reminds all Airmen of the complexities inherent in a successful joint operation. It highlights the necessity of clear lines of command, and it reminds us that organizational capabilities and proper coordination of joint activities cannot be taken for granted. It is also vital to realize that lessons learned from this operation were used to improve our joint combat planning and capabilities in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. As a Service, we will continue to refine the employment of our expeditionary air and space forces in joint operations to ensure their effectiveness over any adversary. We will all benefit from embracing and applying the thorough and thoughtful reporting and analysis in these and other lessons learned reports. We cannot afford to do less.Executive Summary * Chapter 1: Introduction * Chapter 2: Planning for Operations in the Khowst-Gardez Region * Chapter 3: Widening the Plan * Chapter 4: The First 72 Hours: 2-4 March 2002 * Chapter 5: Renewing the Attack: 5-15 March 2002 * Chapter 6: Persistent Close Air Support * Chapter 7: ObservationsOperation ANACONDA is a unique case study in the application of force. From 2-16 March 2002, a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF), built around 1,411 U.S. Army soldiers, and Special Operations Forces (SOF) from the United States and six other nations took on the task of clearing the Shahi Kot valley in eastern Afghanistan of al-Qaeda and Taliban forces who had survived earlier battles. It was a complex, non-linear battle that demanded full integration of Joint forces-and, to the frustration of all, revealed some Joint warfighting stress points. For the first time in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, American forces were locked in a prolonged ground battle in difficult terrain. Eight Americans (5 U.S. Army, 2 USAF and 1 U.S. Navy SEAL) died during Operation ANACONDA and 80 were wounded. Seven of those deaths came on 4 March 2002 at the ridgeline at Takur Gar during a helicopter insertion of a Special Forces team and an attempt to rescue them.
Award-winning combat journalist Sean Naylor reveals a firsthand account of the largest battle fought by American military forces in Afghanistan in an attempt to destroy al-Qaeda and Taliban forces. At dawn on March 2, 2002, America's first major battle of the 21st century began. Over 200 soldiers of the 101st Airborne and 10th Mountain Division flew into Afghanistan's Shah-i-Kot Valley—and into the mouth of a buzz saw. They were about to pay a bloody price for strategic, high-level miscalculations that underestimated the enemy's strength and willingness to fight. Naylor, an eyewitness to the battle, details the failures of military intelligence and planning, while vividly portraying the astonishing heroism of these young, untested US soldiers. Denied the extra support with which they trained, these troops nevertheless proved their worth in brutal combat and prevented an American military disaster.
Book Synopsis Not a Good Day to Die by : Sean Naylor
Download or read book Not a Good Day to Die written by Sean Naylor and published by Penguin. This book was released on 2005-03-01 with total page 476 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Award-winning combat journalist Sean Naylor reveals a firsthand account of the largest battle fought by American military forces in Afghanistan in an attempt to destroy al-Qaeda and Taliban forces. At dawn on March 2, 2002, America's first major battle of the 21st century began. Over 200 soldiers of the 101st Airborne and 10th Mountain Division flew into Afghanistan's Shah-i-Kot Valley—and into the mouth of a buzz saw. They were about to pay a bloody price for strategic, high-level miscalculations that underestimated the enemy's strength and willingness to fight. Naylor, an eyewitness to the battle, details the failures of military intelligence and planning, while vividly portraying the astonishing heroism of these young, untested US soldiers. Denied the extra support with which they trained, these troops nevertheless proved their worth in brutal combat and prevented an American military disaster.
"One of the most crucial joint combat operations in Afghanistan was Operation ANACONDA, designed and executed to remove the last remaining organized Taliban resistance. Operation ANACONDA generated lessons learned involving many aspects of the art of joint warfare."--Chief of Staff letter
Book Synopsis Operation Anaconda by :
Download or read book Operation Anaconda written by and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: "One of the most crucial joint combat operations in Afghanistan was Operation ANACONDA, designed and executed to remove the last remaining organized Taliban resistance. Operation ANACONDA generated lessons learned involving many aspects of the art of joint warfare."--Chief of Staff letter
One of the most crucial joint combat operations in Afghanistan was Operation ANACONDA, designed and executed to remove the last remaining organized Taliban resistance. Operation ANACONDA generated lessons learned involving many aspects of the art of joint warfare.
Book Synopsis Operation ANACONDA, an Air Power Perspective by :
Download or read book Operation ANACONDA, an Air Power Perspective written by and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 135 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: One of the most crucial joint combat operations in Afghanistan was Operation ANACONDA, designed and executed to remove the last remaining organized Taliban resistance. Operation ANACONDA generated lessons learned involving many aspects of the art of joint warfare.
The defense debate tends to treat Afghanistan as either a revolution or a fluke: either the "Afghan Model" of special operations forces (SOF) plus precision munitions plus an indigenous ally is a widely applicable template for American defense planning, or it is a nonreplicable product of local idiosyncrasies. In fact, it is neither. The Afghan campaign of last fall and winter was actually much closer to a typical 20th century mid-intensity conflict, albeit one with unusually heavy fire support for one side. And this view has very different implications than either proponents or skeptics of the Afghan Model now claim. Afghan Model skeptics often point to Afghanistan's unusual culture of defection or the Taliban's poor skill or motivation as grounds for doubting the war's relevance to the future. Afghanistan's culture is certainly unusual, and there were many defections. The great bulk, however, occurred after the military tide had turned not before-hand. They were effects, not causes. The Afghan Taliban were surely unskilled and ill-motivated. The non-Afghan al Qaeda, however, have proven resolute and capable fighters. Their host's collapse was not attributable to any al Qaeda shortage of commitment or training. Afghan Model proponents, by contrast, credit precision weapons with annihilating enemies at a distance before they could close with our commandos or indigenous allies. Hence the model's broad utility: with SOF-directed bombs doing the real killing, even ragtag local militias will suffice as allies. All they need do is screen U.S. commandos from the occasional hostile survivor and occupy the abandoned ground thereafter. Yet the actual fighting in Afghanistan involved substantial close combat. Al Qaeda counterattackers closed, unseen, to pointblank range of friendly forces in battles at Highway 4 and Sayed Slim Kalay.
Book Synopsis Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy by :
Download or read book Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy written by and published by DIANE Publishing. This book was released on 2002 with total page 68 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The defense debate tends to treat Afghanistan as either a revolution or a fluke: either the "Afghan Model" of special operations forces (SOF) plus precision munitions plus an indigenous ally is a widely applicable template for American defense planning, or it is a nonreplicable product of local idiosyncrasies. In fact, it is neither. The Afghan campaign of last fall and winter was actually much closer to a typical 20th century mid-intensity conflict, albeit one with unusually heavy fire support for one side. And this view has very different implications than either proponents or skeptics of the Afghan Model now claim. Afghan Model skeptics often point to Afghanistan's unusual culture of defection or the Taliban's poor skill or motivation as grounds for doubting the war's relevance to the future. Afghanistan's culture is certainly unusual, and there were many defections. The great bulk, however, occurred after the military tide had turned not before-hand. They were effects, not causes. The Afghan Taliban were surely unskilled and ill-motivated. The non-Afghan al Qaeda, however, have proven resolute and capable fighters. Their host's collapse was not attributable to any al Qaeda shortage of commitment or training. Afghan Model proponents, by contrast, credit precision weapons with annihilating enemies at a distance before they could close with our commandos or indigenous allies. Hence the model's broad utility: with SOF-directed bombs doing the real killing, even ragtag local militias will suffice as allies. All they need do is screen U.S. commandos from the occasional hostile survivor and occupy the abandoned ground thereafter. Yet the actual fighting in Afghanistan involved substantial close combat. Al Qaeda counterattackers closed, unseen, to pointblank range of friendly forces in battles at Highway 4 and Sayed Slim Kalay.
