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Author: Steven Horst
Publisher: Steven Horst
Published: 2011-09-09
Total Pages: 452
ISBN-13: 0984017631
DOWNLOAD EBOOKDownload or read book Symbols, Computation, and Intentionality written by Steven Horst and published by Steven Horst. This book was released on 2011-09-09 with total page 452 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Symbols, Computation and Intentionality written by Steven Wilson Horst and published by . This book was released on 1990 with total page 520 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author: Susan Schneider
Publisher: MIT Press
Published: 2015-01-30
Total Pages: 272
ISBN-13: 0262527456
DOWNLOAD EBOOKA philosophical refashioning of the Language of Thought approach and the related computational theory of mind. The language of thought (LOT) approach to the nature of mind has been highly influential in cognitive science and the philosophy of mind; and yet, as Susan Schneider argues, its philosophical foundations are weak. In this philosophical refashioning of LOT and the related computational theory of mind (CTM), Schneider offers a different framework than has been developed by LOT and CTM's main architect, Jerry Fodor: one that seeks integration with neuroscience, repudiates Fodor's pessimism about the capacity of cognitive science to explain cognition, embraces pragmatism, and advances a different approach to the nature of concepts, mental symbols, and modes of presentation. According to the LOT approach, conceptual thought is determined by the manipulation of mental symbols according to algorithms. Schneider tackles three key problems that have plagued the LOT approach for decades: the computational nature of the central system (the system responsible for higher cognitive function); the nature of symbols; and Frege cases. To address these problems,] Schneider develops a computational theory that is based on the Global Workspace approach; develops a theory of symbols, "the algorithmic view"; and brings her theory of symbols to bear on LOT's account of the causation of thought and behavior. In the course of solving these problems, Schneider shows that LOT must make peace with both computationalism and pragmatism; indeed, the new conception of symbols renders LOT a pragmatist theory. And LOT must turn its focus to cognitive and computational neuroscience for its naturalism to succeed.
Download or read book The Language of Thought written by Susan Schneider and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2015-01-30 with total page 272 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A philosophical refashioning of the Language of Thought approach and the related computational theory of mind. The language of thought (LOT) approach to the nature of mind has been highly influential in cognitive science and the philosophy of mind; and yet, as Susan Schneider argues, its philosophical foundations are weak. In this philosophical refashioning of LOT and the related computational theory of mind (CTM), Schneider offers a different framework than has been developed by LOT and CTM's main architect, Jerry Fodor: one that seeks integration with neuroscience, repudiates Fodor's pessimism about the capacity of cognitive science to explain cognition, embraces pragmatism, and advances a different approach to the nature of concepts, mental symbols, and modes of presentation. According to the LOT approach, conceptual thought is determined by the manipulation of mental symbols according to algorithms. Schneider tackles three key problems that have plagued the LOT approach for decades: the computational nature of the central system (the system responsible for higher cognitive function); the nature of symbols; and Frege cases. To address these problems,] Schneider develops a computational theory that is based on the Global Workspace approach; develops a theory of symbols, "the algorithmic view"; and brings her theory of symbols to bear on LOT's account of the causation of thought and behavior. In the course of solving these problems, Schneider shows that LOT must make peace with both computationalism and pragmatism; indeed, the new conception of symbols renders LOT a pragmatist theory. And LOT must turn its focus to cognitive and computational neuroscience for its naturalism to succeed.
Author: Tim Crane
Publisher: Presbyterian Publishing Corp
Published: 2003-04-24
Total Pages: 272
ISBN-13: 0203426312
DOWNLOAD EBOOKA fascinating exploration of the theories and arguments surrounding the notions of thought and representation. Now in its 2nd edition, Cranes's classic text has introduced thousands to some of the most important ideas in philosophy of mind.
Download or read book The Mechanical Mind written by Tim Crane and published by Presbyterian Publishing Corp. This book was released on 2003-04-24 with total page 272 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A fascinating exploration of the theories and arguments surrounding the notions of thought and representation. Now in its 2nd edition, Cranes's classic text has introduced thousands to some of the most important ideas in philosophy of mind.
Author: Sarah Robins
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2009-09-11
Total Pages: 736
ISBN-13: 1134155786
DOWNLOAD EBOOKThe Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology is an invaluable guide and major reference source to the major topics, problems, concepts and debates in philosophy of psychology and is the first companion of its kind. A team of renowned international contributors provide forty-two chapters organised into six clear parts: I. Historical background to the philosophy of psychology II. Psychological explanation III. Cognition and representation IV. The biological basis of psychology V. Perceptual experience VI. Personhood The Companion covers key topics such as the origins of experimental psychology; folk psychology; behaviorism and functionalism; philosophy, psychology and neuroscience; the language of thought, modularity, nativism and representational theories of mind; consciousness and the senses; personal identity; the philosophy of psychopathology and dreams, emotion and temporality. Essential reading for all students of philosophy of mind, science and psychology, The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology will also be of interest to anyone studying psychology and its related disciplines.
Download or read book The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology written by Sarah Robins and published by Routledge. This book was released on 2009-09-11 with total page 736 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology is an invaluable guide and major reference source to the major topics, problems, concepts and debates in philosophy of psychology and is the first companion of its kind. A team of renowned international contributors provide forty-two chapters organised into six clear parts: I. Historical background to the philosophy of psychology II. Psychological explanation III. Cognition and representation IV. The biological basis of psychology V. Perceptual experience VI. Personhood The Companion covers key topics such as the origins of experimental psychology; folk psychology; behaviorism and functionalism; philosophy, psychology and neuroscience; the language of thought, modularity, nativism and representational theories of mind; consciousness and the senses; personal identity; the philosophy of psychopathology and dreams, emotion and temporality. Essential reading for all students of philosophy of mind, science and psychology, The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology will also be of interest to anyone studying psychology and its related disciplines.
Author: James Bird
Publisher: Learning Matters
Published: 2017-03-06
Total Pages: 275
ISBN-13: 1526412446
DOWNLOAD EBOOKWhether you are currently teaching or training to teach the primary computing curriculum, you need to know what effective teaching of computing in primary schools actually looks like. Written for non specialists and trainees, this book uses exemplar primary computing lessons as a starting point for developing subject knowledge. It′s a unique but tried and tested approach to developing your computing subject knowledge alongside your teaching practice. The current computing curriculum is explored in manageable chunks and there is no "scary" tech speak; everything is explained clearly and accessibly. You will find example lesson plans alongside every element of the curriculum that can be adapted to suit different year groups and different schools. This resourceful guide inspires an approach to teaching computing that is about creativity and encouraging problem solving using technology as a tool. NEW TO THIS EDITION: Updated throughout and includes information on new apps and other resources for teaching and a brand new chapter on teaching with tablets in the primary classroom. This book is part of the Lessons in Teaching series and includes additional online resources on its accompanying website.
Download or read book Lessons in Teaching Computing in Primary Schools written by James Bird and published by Learning Matters. This book was released on 2017-03-06 with total page 275 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Whether you are currently teaching or training to teach the primary computing curriculum, you need to know what effective teaching of computing in primary schools actually looks like. Written for non specialists and trainees, this book uses exemplar primary computing lessons as a starting point for developing subject knowledge. It′s a unique but tried and tested approach to developing your computing subject knowledge alongside your teaching practice. The current computing curriculum is explored in manageable chunks and there is no "scary" tech speak; everything is explained clearly and accessibly. You will find example lesson plans alongside every element of the curriculum that can be adapted to suit different year groups and different schools. This resourceful guide inspires an approach to teaching computing that is about creativity and encouraging problem solving using technology as a tool. NEW TO THIS EDITION: Updated throughout and includes information on new apps and other resources for teaching and a brand new chapter on teaching with tablets in the primary classroom. This book is part of the Lessons in Teaching series and includes additional online resources on its accompanying website.
Author: John-Michael Kuczynski
Publisher: John Benjamins Publishing
Published: 2007-01-01
Total Pages: 542
ISBN-13: 9789027252050
DOWNLOAD EBOOKWhat is it to have a concept? What is it to make an inference? What is it to be rational? On the basis of recent developments in semantics, a number of authors have embraced answers to these questions that have radically counterintuitive consequences, for example: One can rationally accept self-contradictory propositions (e.g. Smith is a composer and Smith is not a composer). Psychological states are causally inert: beliefs and desires do nothing. The mind cannot be understood in terms of folk-psychological concepts (e.g. belief, desire, intention). One can have a single concept without having any others: an otherwise conceptless creature could grasp the concept of justice or of the number seven. Thoughts are sentence-tokens, and thought-processes are driven by the syntactic, not the semantic, properties of those tokens. In the first half of Conceptual Atomism and the Computational Theory of Mind, John-Michael Kuczynski argues that these implausible but widely held views are direct consequences of a popular doctrine known as content-externalism, this being the view that the contents of one's mental states are constitutively dependent on facts about the external world. Kuczynski shows that content-externalism involves a failure to distinguish between, on the one hand, what is literally meant by linguistic expressions and, on the other hand, the information that one must work through to compute the literal meanings of such expressions. The second half of the present work concerns the Computational Theory of Mind (CTM). Underlying CTM is an acceptance of conceptual atomism the view that a creature can have a single concept without having any others and also an acceptance of the view that concepts are not descriptive (i.e. that one can have a concept of a thing without knowing of any description that is satisfied by that thing). Kuczynski shows that both views are false, one reason being that they presuppose the truth of content-externalism, another being that they are incompatible with the epistemological anti-foundationalism proven correct by Wilfred Sellars and Laurence Bonjour. Kuczynski also shows that CTM involves a misunderstanding of terms such as computation, syntax, algorithm and formal truth; and he provides novel analyses of the concepts expressed by these terms. (Series A)
Download or read book Conceptual Atomism and the Computational Theory of Mind written by John-Michael Kuczynski and published by John Benjamins Publishing. This book was released on 2007-01-01 with total page 542 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: What is it to have a concept? What is it to make an inference? What is it to be rational? On the basis of recent developments in semantics, a number of authors have embraced answers to these questions that have radically counterintuitive consequences, for example: One can rationally accept self-contradictory propositions (e.g. Smith is a composer and Smith is not a composer). Psychological states are causally inert: beliefs and desires do nothing. The mind cannot be understood in terms of folk-psychological concepts (e.g. belief, desire, intention). One can have a single concept without having any others: an otherwise conceptless creature could grasp the concept of justice or of the number seven. Thoughts are sentence-tokens, and thought-processes are driven by the syntactic, not the semantic, properties of those tokens. In the first half of Conceptual Atomism and the Computational Theory of Mind, John-Michael Kuczynski argues that these implausible but widely held views are direct consequences of a popular doctrine known as content-externalism, this being the view that the contents of one's mental states are constitutively dependent on facts about the external world. Kuczynski shows that content-externalism involves a failure to distinguish between, on the one hand, what is literally meant by linguistic expressions and, on the other hand, the information that one must work through to compute the literal meanings of such expressions. The second half of the present work concerns the Computational Theory of Mind (CTM). Underlying CTM is an acceptance of conceptual atomism the view that a creature can have a single concept without having any others and also an acceptance of the view that concepts are not descriptive (i.e. that one can have a concept of a thing without knowing of any description that is satisfied by that thing). Kuczynski shows that both views are false, one reason being that they presuppose the truth of content-externalism, another being that they are incompatible with the epistemological anti-foundationalism proven correct by Wilfred Sellars and Laurence Bonjour. Kuczynski also shows that CTM involves a misunderstanding of terms such as computation, syntax, algorithm and formal truth; and he provides novel analyses of the concepts expressed by these terms. (Series A)
Author: Steven Horst
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Published: 2007-08-30
Total Pages: 240
ISBN-13: 0190295589
DOWNLOAD EBOOKContemporary philosophers of mind tend to assume that the world of nature can be reduced to basic physics. Yet there are features of the mind consciousness, intentionality, normativity that do not seem to be reducible to physics or neuroscience. This explanatory gap between mind and brain has thus been a major cause of concern in recent philosophy of mind. Reductionists hold that, despite all appearances, the mind can be reduced to the brain. Eliminativists hold that it cannot, and that this implies that there is something illegitimate about the mentalistic vocabulary. Dualists hold that the mental is irreducible, and that this implies either a substance or a property dualism. Mysterian non-reductive physicalists hold that the mind is uniquely irreducible, perhaps due to some limitation of our self-understanding. In this book, Steven Horst argues that this whole conversation is based on assumptions left over from an outdated philosophy of science. While reductionism was part of the philosophical orthodoxy fifty years ago, it has been decisively rejected by philosophers of science over the past thirty years, and for good reason. True reductions are in fact exceedingly rare in the sciences, and the conviction that they were there to be found was an artifact of armchair assumptions of 17th century Rationalists and 20th century Logical Empiricists. The explanatory gaps between mind and brain are far from unique. In fact, in the sciences it is gaps all the way down.And if reductions are rare in even the physical sciences, there is little reason to expect them in the case of psychology. Horst argues that this calls for a complete re-thinking of the contemporary problematic in philosophy of mind. Reductionism, dualism, eliminativism and non-reductive materialism are each severely compromised by post-reductionist philosophy of science, and philosophy of mind is in need of a new paradigm. Horst suggests that such a paradigm might be found in Cognitive Pluralism: the view that human cognitive architecture constrains us to understand the world through a plurality of partial, idealized, and pragmatically-constrained models, each employing a particular representational system optimized for its own problem domain. Such an architecture can explain the disunities of knowledge, and is plausible on evolutionary grounds.
Download or read book Beyond Reduction written by Steven Horst and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2007-08-30 with total page 240 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Contemporary philosophers of mind tend to assume that the world of nature can be reduced to basic physics. Yet there are features of the mind consciousness, intentionality, normativity that do not seem to be reducible to physics or neuroscience. This explanatory gap between mind and brain has thus been a major cause of concern in recent philosophy of mind. Reductionists hold that, despite all appearances, the mind can be reduced to the brain. Eliminativists hold that it cannot, and that this implies that there is something illegitimate about the mentalistic vocabulary. Dualists hold that the mental is irreducible, and that this implies either a substance or a property dualism. Mysterian non-reductive physicalists hold that the mind is uniquely irreducible, perhaps due to some limitation of our self-understanding. In this book, Steven Horst argues that this whole conversation is based on assumptions left over from an outdated philosophy of science. While reductionism was part of the philosophical orthodoxy fifty years ago, it has been decisively rejected by philosophers of science over the past thirty years, and for good reason. True reductions are in fact exceedingly rare in the sciences, and the conviction that they were there to be found was an artifact of armchair assumptions of 17th century Rationalists and 20th century Logical Empiricists. The explanatory gaps between mind and brain are far from unique. In fact, in the sciences it is gaps all the way down.And if reductions are rare in even the physical sciences, there is little reason to expect them in the case of psychology. Horst argues that this calls for a complete re-thinking of the contemporary problematic in philosophy of mind. Reductionism, dualism, eliminativism and non-reductive materialism are each severely compromised by post-reductionist philosophy of science, and philosophy of mind is in need of a new paradigm. Horst suggests that such a paradigm might be found in Cognitive Pluralism: the view that human cognitive architecture constrains us to understand the world through a plurality of partial, idealized, and pragmatically-constrained models, each employing a particular representational system optimized for its own problem domain. Such an architecture can explain the disunities of knowledge, and is plausible on evolutionary grounds.
Author: Steven W. Horst
Publisher: MIT Press
Published: 2011
Total Pages: 292
ISBN-13: 0262015250
DOWNLOAD EBOOKAn account of scientific laws that vindicates the status of psychological laws and shows natural laws to be compatible with free will. In Laws, Mind, and Free Will, Steven Horst addresses the apparent dissonance between the picture of the natural world that arises from the sciences and our understanding of ourselves as agents who think and act. If the mind and the world are entirely governed by natural laws, there seems to be no room left for free will to operate. Moreover, although the laws of physical science are clear and verifiable, the sciences of the mind seem to yield only rough generalizations rather than universal laws of nature. Horst argues that these two familiar problems in philosophy--the apparent tension between free will and natural law and the absence of "strict" laws in the sciences of the mind--are artifacts of a particular philosophical thesis about the nature of laws: that laws make claims about how objects actually behave. Horst argues against this Empiricist orthodoxy and proposes an alternative account of laws--an account rooted in a cognitivist approach to philosophy of science. Horst argues that once we abandon the Empiricist misunderstandings of the nature of laws there is no contrast between "strict" laws and generalizations about the mind ("ceteris paribus" laws, laws hedged by the caveat "other things being equal"), and that a commitment to laws is compatible with a commitment to the existence of free will. Horst's alternative account, which he calls "cognitive Pluralism," vindicates the truth of psychological laws and resolves the tension between human freedom and the sciences.
Download or read book Laws, Mind, and Free Will written by Steven W. Horst and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2011 with total page 292 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: An account of scientific laws that vindicates the status of psychological laws and shows natural laws to be compatible with free will. In Laws, Mind, and Free Will, Steven Horst addresses the apparent dissonance between the picture of the natural world that arises from the sciences and our understanding of ourselves as agents who think and act. If the mind and the world are entirely governed by natural laws, there seems to be no room left for free will to operate. Moreover, although the laws of physical science are clear and verifiable, the sciences of the mind seem to yield only rough generalizations rather than universal laws of nature. Horst argues that these two familiar problems in philosophy--the apparent tension between free will and natural law and the absence of "strict" laws in the sciences of the mind--are artifacts of a particular philosophical thesis about the nature of laws: that laws make claims about how objects actually behave. Horst argues against this Empiricist orthodoxy and proposes an alternative account of laws--an account rooted in a cognitivist approach to philosophy of science. Horst argues that once we abandon the Empiricist misunderstandings of the nature of laws there is no contrast between "strict" laws and generalizations about the mind ("ceteris paribus" laws, laws hedged by the caveat "other things being equal"), and that a commitment to laws is compatible with a commitment to the existence of free will. Horst's alternative account, which he calls "cognitive Pluralism," vindicates the truth of psychological laws and resolves the tension between human freedom and the sciences.
Author: Vincent C. Müller
Publisher: Springer
Published: 2016-06-07
Total Pages: 572
ISBN-13: 3319264850
DOWNLOAD EBOOKThis volume offers a look at the fundamental issues of present and future AI, especially from cognitive science, computer science, neuroscience and philosophy. This work examines the conditions for artificial intelligence, how these relate to the conditions for intelligence in humans and other natural agents, as well as ethical and societal problems that artificial intelligence raises or will raise. The key issues this volume investigates include the relation of AI and cognitive science, ethics of AI and robotics, brain emulation and simulation, hybrid systems and cyborgs, intelligence and intelligence testing, interactive systems, multi-agent systems, and super intelligence. Based on the 2nd conference on “Theory and Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence” held in Oxford, the volume includes prominent researchers within the field from around the world.
Download or read book Fundamental Issues of Artificial Intelligence written by Vincent C. Müller and published by Springer. This book was released on 2016-06-07 with total page 572 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This volume offers a look at the fundamental issues of present and future AI, especially from cognitive science, computer science, neuroscience and philosophy. This work examines the conditions for artificial intelligence, how these relate to the conditions for intelligence in humans and other natural agents, as well as ethical and societal problems that artificial intelligence raises or will raise. The key issues this volume investigates include the relation of AI and cognitive science, ethics of AI and robotics, brain emulation and simulation, hybrid systems and cyborgs, intelligence and intelligence testing, interactive systems, multi-agent systems, and super intelligence. Based on the 2nd conference on “Theory and Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence” held in Oxford, the volume includes prominent researchers within the field from around the world.
