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Why did Britain decide in 1947 to build an atomic bomb? What plans were there for using it? Employing the previously inaccessible confidential records of the British government in the decade after World War II, including those of the Chiefs of Staff, this book provides the first detailed assessment of the technical, political, and economic factors behind British nuclear policy. The authors argue that British thinking on nuclear deterrence was distinctive and made a unique contribution to early theorizing on nuclear weapons, and compare the strategic thought of Britain and the United States.
Book Synopsis The British Origins of Nuclear Strategy, 1945-1955 by : Ian Clark
Download or read book The British Origins of Nuclear Strategy, 1945-1955 written by Ian Clark and published by . This book was released on 1989 with total page 280 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Why did Britain decide in 1947 to build an atomic bomb? What plans were there for using it? Employing the previously inaccessible confidential records of the British government in the decade after World War II, including those of the Chiefs of Staff, this book provides the first detailed assessment of the technical, political, and economic factors behind British nuclear policy. The authors argue that British thinking on nuclear deterrence was distinctive and made a unique contribution to early theorizing on nuclear weapons, and compare the strategic thought of Britain and the United States.
The United States took almost a decade after Hiroshima and Nagasaki to develop a coherent strategy of nuclear deterrence. This comprehensive study by two careful and well-informed historians provides the best explanation we have of why this process took so long; it also suggests the inherent difficulties of relying on nuclear weapons to provide security in the first place. Required reading for anyone interested in the early history of the nuclear era.
Book Synopsis The Origins of U.S. Nuclear Strategy, 1945-1953 by : Samuel R. Williamson Jr
Download or read book The Origins of U.S. Nuclear Strategy, 1945-1953 written by Samuel R. Williamson Jr and published by Springer. This book was released on 2016-04-30 with total page 231 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The United States took almost a decade after Hiroshima and Nagasaki to develop a coherent strategy of nuclear deterrence. This comprehensive study by two careful and well-informed historians provides the best explanation we have of why this process took so long; it also suggests the inherent difficulties of relying on nuclear weapons to provide security in the first place. Required reading for anyone interested in the early history of the nuclear era.
This text focuses on the disagreements which existed in British political and military circles over nuclear strategy directly after World War II. Based on recently released documents, it argues that British policy in this important area was much more ambiguous than is commonly supposed.
Book Synopsis Ambiguity and Deterrence by : John Baylis
Download or read book Ambiguity and Deterrence written by John Baylis and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 1995 with total page 522 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This text focuses on the disagreements which existed in British political and military circles over nuclear strategy directly after World War II. Based on recently released documents, it argues that British policy in this important area was much more ambiguous than is commonly supposed.
The United States took almost a decade after Hiroshima and Nagasaki to develop a coherent strategy of nuclear deterrence. This comprehensive study by two careful and well-informed historians provides the best explanation we have of why this process took so long; it also suggests the inherent difficulties of relying on nuclear weapons to provide security in the first place. Required reading for anyone interested in the early history of the nuclear era.
Book Synopsis The Origins of U.S. Nuclear Strategy, 1945-1953 by : Samuel R. Williamson Jr
Download or read book The Origins of U.S. Nuclear Strategy, 1945-1953 written by Samuel R. Williamson Jr and published by Palgrave Macmillan. This book was released on 1993-06-15 with total page 224 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The United States took almost a decade after Hiroshima and Nagasaki to develop a coherent strategy of nuclear deterrence. This comprehensive study by two careful and well-informed historians provides the best explanation we have of why this process took so long; it also suggests the inherent difficulties of relying on nuclear weapons to provide security in the first place. Required reading for anyone interested in the early history of the nuclear era.
Johnston argues that the preemptive first-use of nuclear weapons, long the foundation of American nuclear strategy, was not the carefully reasoned response to a growing Soviet conventional threat. Instead, it was part of a process of cultural 'socialization', by which the United States reconstituted the previously nationalist strategic cultures of the European allies into a seamless western community directed by Washington. Building a bridge between theory and practice, this book examines the usefulness of cultural theory in international history.
Book Synopsis Hegemony and Culture in the Origins of NATO Nuclear First-Use, 1945–1955 by : A. Johnston
Download or read book Hegemony and Culture in the Origins of NATO Nuclear First-Use, 1945–1955 written by A. Johnston and published by Springer. This book was released on 2005-11-18 with total page 329 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Johnston argues that the preemptive first-use of nuclear weapons, long the foundation of American nuclear strategy, was not the carefully reasoned response to a growing Soviet conventional threat. Instead, it was part of a process of cultural 'socialization', by which the United States reconstituted the previously nationalist strategic cultures of the European allies into a seamless western community directed by Washington. Building a bridge between theory and practice, this book examines the usefulness of cultural theory in international history.
This book explores aspects of the social and cultural history of nuclear Britain in the Cold War era (1945-1991) and contributes to a more multivalent exploration of the consequences of nuclear choices which are too often left unacknowledged by historians of post-war Britain. In the years after 1945, the British government mobilised money, scientific knowledge, people and military-industrial capacity to create both an independent nuclear deterrent and the generation of electricity through nuclear reactors. This expensive and vast 'technopolitical' project, mostly top-secret and run by small sub-committees within government, was central to broader Cold War strategy and policy. Recent attempts to map the resulting social and cultural history of these military-industrial policy decisions suggest that nuclear mobilisation had far-reaching consequences for British life. The chapters in this book were originally published as a special issue of Contemporary British History.
Book Synopsis British Nuclear Mobilisation Since 1945 by : Taylor & Francis Group
Download or read book British Nuclear Mobilisation Since 1945 written by Taylor & Francis Group and published by Routledge. This book was released on 2021-05-19 with total page 142 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book explores aspects of the social and cultural history of nuclear Britain in the Cold War era (1945-1991) and contributes to a more multivalent exploration of the consequences of nuclear choices which are too often left unacknowledged by historians of post-war Britain. In the years after 1945, the British government mobilised money, scientific knowledge, people and military-industrial capacity to create both an independent nuclear deterrent and the generation of electricity through nuclear reactors. This expensive and vast 'technopolitical' project, mostly top-secret and run by small sub-committees within government, was central to broader Cold War strategy and policy. Recent attempts to map the resulting social and cultural history of these military-industrial policy decisions suggest that nuclear mobilisation had far-reaching consequences for British life. The chapters in this book were originally published as a special issue of Contemporary British History.
This volume examines the origins and early years of the Cold War in the first comprehensive historical reexamination of the period. A team of leading scholars shows how the conflict evolved from the geopolitical, ideological, economic and sociopolitical environments of the two world wars and interwar period.
Book Synopsis The Cambridge History of the Cold War by : Melvyn P. Leffler
Download or read book The Cambridge History of the Cold War written by Melvyn P. Leffler and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2010-03-25 with total page 663 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This volume examines the origins and early years of the Cold War in the first comprehensive historical reexamination of the period. A team of leading scholars shows how the conflict evolved from the geopolitical, ideological, economic and sociopolitical environments of the two world wars and interwar period.
"Volume II of The Official History of the UK Strategic Nuclear Deterrent provides an authoritative and in-depth examination of the British government's strategic nuclear policy from 1964 to 1970. Written with full access to the UK documentary record, Volume II examines the controversies that developed over nuclear policy following the arrival in office of a Labour government led by Harold Wilson in October 1964 that openly questioned the independence of the deterrent. Having decided to preserve the Polaris programme, Labour ministers were nevertheless committed not to develop another generation of nuclear weapons beyond those in the pipeline, placing major doubts over the long-term future of the nuclear programme and collaboration with the United States. Defence planners also became increasingly concerned that the deployment of Soviet anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defences around Moscow threatened to undermine the ability of Polaris to fulfil its role as a national strategic nuclear deterrent. During 1967, under heavy pressures to control defence spending, a protracted debate was conducted within Whitehall over the future of Polaris and how to respond to the evolving ABM challenge. The volume concludes with Labour's defeat at the general election of June 1970, by which time the Royal Navy had assumed the nuclear deterrent role from the RAF, and plans had already been formulated for a UK project to improve Polaris which could both ensure its continuing credibility and rejuvenate the Anglo-American nuclear relationship."--Back cover.
Book Synopsis The Official History of the UK Strategic Nuclear Deterrent by : Matthew Jones
Download or read book The Official History of the UK Strategic Nuclear Deterrent written by Matthew Jones and published by Taylor & Francis. This book was released on 2017-05-12 with total page 569 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: "Volume II of The Official History of the UK Strategic Nuclear Deterrent provides an authoritative and in-depth examination of the British government's strategic nuclear policy from 1964 to 1970. Written with full access to the UK documentary record, Volume II examines the controversies that developed over nuclear policy following the arrival in office of a Labour government led by Harold Wilson in October 1964 that openly questioned the independence of the deterrent. Having decided to preserve the Polaris programme, Labour ministers were nevertheless committed not to develop another generation of nuclear weapons beyond those in the pipeline, placing major doubts over the long-term future of the nuclear programme and collaboration with the United States. Defence planners also became increasingly concerned that the deployment of Soviet anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defences around Moscow threatened to undermine the ability of Polaris to fulfil its role as a national strategic nuclear deterrent. During 1967, under heavy pressures to control defence spending, a protracted debate was conducted within Whitehall over the future of Polaris and how to respond to the evolving ABM challenge. The volume concludes with Labour's defeat at the general election of June 1970, by which time the Royal Navy had assumed the nuclear deterrent role from the RAF, and plans had already been formulated for a UK project to improve Polaris which could both ensure its continuing credibility and rejuvenate the Anglo-American nuclear relationship."--Back cover.
Nearly 40 years after the concept of finite deterrence was popularized by the Johnson administration, nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) thinking appears to be in decline. The United States has rejected the notion that threatening population centers with nuclear attacks is a legitimate way to assure deterrence. Most recently, it withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, an agreement based on MAD. American opposition to MAD also is reflected in the Bush administration's desire to develop smaller, more accurate nuclear weapons that would reduce the number of innocent civilians killed in a nuclear strike. Still, MAD is influential in a number of ways. First, other countries, like China, have not abandoned the idea that holding their adversaries' cities at risk is necessary to assure their own strategic security. Nor have U.S. and allied security officials and experts fully abandoned the idea. At a minimum, acquiring nuclear weapons is still viewed as being sensible to face off a hostile neighbor that might strike one's own cities. Thus, our diplomats have been warning China that Japan would be under tremendous pressure to go nuclear if North Korea persisted in acquiring a few crude weapons of its own. Similarly, Israeli officials have long argued, without criticism, that they would not be second in acquiring nuclear weapons in the Middle East. Indeed, given that Israelis surrounded by enemies that would not hesitate to destroy its population if they could, Washington finds Israel's retention of a significant nuclear capability totally "understandable."
Book Synopsis Getting MAD: Nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction, Its Origins and Practice by :
Download or read book Getting MAD: Nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction, Its Origins and Practice written by and published by DIANE Publishing. This book was released on 2004 with total page 369 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Nearly 40 years after the concept of finite deterrence was popularized by the Johnson administration, nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) thinking appears to be in decline. The United States has rejected the notion that threatening population centers with nuclear attacks is a legitimate way to assure deterrence. Most recently, it withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, an agreement based on MAD. American opposition to MAD also is reflected in the Bush administration's desire to develop smaller, more accurate nuclear weapons that would reduce the number of innocent civilians killed in a nuclear strike. Still, MAD is influential in a number of ways. First, other countries, like China, have not abandoned the idea that holding their adversaries' cities at risk is necessary to assure their own strategic security. Nor have U.S. and allied security officials and experts fully abandoned the idea. At a minimum, acquiring nuclear weapons is still viewed as being sensible to face off a hostile neighbor that might strike one's own cities. Thus, our diplomats have been warning China that Japan would be under tremendous pressure to go nuclear if North Korea persisted in acquiring a few crude weapons of its own. Similarly, Israeli officials have long argued, without criticism, that they would not be second in acquiring nuclear weapons in the Middle East. Indeed, given that Israelis surrounded by enemies that would not hesitate to destroy its population if they could, Washington finds Israel's retention of a significant nuclear capability totally "understandable."
Former British Ambassador to the Soviet Union and author of the definitive account of the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, Sir Rodric Braithwaite offers here a tour d'horizon of nuclear policy from the end of World War II and start of the Cold War to the present day. Armageddon and Paranoia unfolds the full history of nuclear weapons that began with the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union and now extends worldwide. For decades, an apocalypse seemed imminent, staved off only by the certainty that if one side launched these missiles the other would launch an equally catastrophic counterstrike. This method of avoiding all-out nuclear warfare was called "Deterrence," a policy of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). Still, though neither side actively wanted to plunge the world into nuclear wasteland, the possibility of war by misjudgment or mistake meant fears could never be entirely assuaged. Both an exploration of Deterrence and the long history of superpower nuclear policy, Armageddon and Paranoia comes at a time when tensions surrounding nuclear armament have begun mounting once more. No book until this one has offered so comprehensive a history of the topic that has guided--at times dominated--the world in which we live.
Book Synopsis Armageddon and Paranoia by : Rodric Braithwaite
Download or read book Armageddon and Paranoia written by Rodric Braithwaite and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2018-02-09 with total page 432 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Former British Ambassador to the Soviet Union and author of the definitive account of the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, Sir Rodric Braithwaite offers here a tour d'horizon of nuclear policy from the end of World War II and start of the Cold War to the present day. Armageddon and Paranoia unfolds the full history of nuclear weapons that began with the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union and now extends worldwide. For decades, an apocalypse seemed imminent, staved off only by the certainty that if one side launched these missiles the other would launch an equally catastrophic counterstrike. This method of avoiding all-out nuclear warfare was called "Deterrence," a policy of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). Still, though neither side actively wanted to plunge the world into nuclear wasteland, the possibility of war by misjudgment or mistake meant fears could never be entirely assuaged. Both an exploration of Deterrence and the long history of superpower nuclear policy, Armageddon and Paranoia comes at a time when tensions surrounding nuclear armament have begun mounting once more. No book until this one has offered so comprehensive a history of the topic that has guided--at times dominated--the world in which we live.
