Author: Annalisa Coliva
Publisher: Springer
Published: 2016-07-05
Total Pages: 288
ISBN-13: 1137326131
DOWNLOAD EBOOKThis book explores the idea that self-knowledge comes in many varieties. We “know ourselves” through many different methods, depending on whether we attend to our propositional attitudes, our perceptions, sensations or emotions. Furthermore, sometimes what we call “self-knowledge” is not the result of any substantial cognitive achievement and the characteristic authority we grant to our psychological self-ascription is a conceptual necessity, redeemed by unravelling the structure of several interlocking concepts. This book critically assesses the main contemporary positions held on the epistemology of self-knowledge. These include robust epistemic accounts such as inner sense views and theory-theories; weak epistemic accounts such as transparency theories and rational internalism and externalism; as well as expressivist and constitutivist approaches. The author offers an innovative “pluralist” position on self-knowledge, emphasizing the complexity of the phenomenon and its resistance to any “monistic” treatment, to pose new and intriguing philosophical challenges.
Book Synopsis The Varieties of Self-Knowledge by : Annalisa Coliva
Download or read book The Varieties of Self-Knowledge written by Annalisa Coliva and published by Springer. This book was released on 2016-07-05 with total page 288 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book explores the idea that self-knowledge comes in many varieties. We “know ourselves” through many different methods, depending on whether we attend to our propositional attitudes, our perceptions, sensations or emotions. Furthermore, sometimes what we call “self-knowledge” is not the result of any substantial cognitive achievement and the characteristic authority we grant to our psychological self-ascription is a conceptual necessity, redeemed by unravelling the structure of several interlocking concepts. This book critically assesses the main contemporary positions held on the epistemology of self-knowledge. These include robust epistemic accounts such as inner sense views and theory-theories; weak epistemic accounts such as transparency theories and rational internalism and externalism; as well as expressivist and constitutivist approaches. The author offers an innovative “pluralist” position on self-knowledge, emphasizing the complexity of the phenomenon and its resistance to any “monistic” treatment, to pose new and intriguing philosophical challenges.